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Article 1

Thaw: The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation

THE EFFICACY OF CYBERSECURITY
REGULATION
David Thaw***
ABSTRACT
Cybersecurity regulation presents an interesting quandary where,
because private entities possess the best information about threats
and defenses, legislatures do—and should—deliberately encode
regulatory capture into the rulemaking process. This relatively
uncommon approach to administrative law, which I describe as
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, involves the combination
of two legislative approaches to engaging private entities’ expertise.
This Article explores the wisdom of those choices by comparing the
efficacy of such private sector engaged regulation with that of a more
traditional, directive mode of regulating cybersecurity adopted by the
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Connecticut; Affiliated Fellow, Information
Society Project, Yale Law School. Funding for this project was provided by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security through the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), the Team for
Research in Ubiquitous Secure Computing (TRUST), and the Rose Foundation. I owe special thanks to
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Pam Samuelson, and Todd LaPorte, for their many years of advice and support in
the development of my Ph.D. dissertation research, upon which this Article is in large part based. I also
express thanks for the substantial assistance of Jennifer King and Aaron Burstein in the development
and conduct of the Chief Information Security Officer interviews. This Article additionally benefited
from the thoughtful comments of Ashok Agrawala, Jack Balkin, Derek Bambauer, Nicholas Bramble,
Yale Braunstein, Brian Carver, John Chuang, Chris Hoofnagle, Leslie Levin, Peter Lindseth, Margot
Kaminski, Elizabeth Khalil, Andrea Matwyshyn, Paul Mazzucco, Christina Mulligan, Mark Paulding,
Gerry Stegmaier, the participants of the 2010 and 2012 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, the members
of the Yale Law School Information Society Project, the participants in the Harvard-Yale-MITColumbia Cyberscholars Workshop Series, and my former fellow Ph.D. students at UC Berkeley’s
School of Information. The editors and staff of the Georgia State University Law Review, especially
including Ashley Worrell and Andrea Iglesias, provided invaluable assistance and input in the
finalization and production of this piece. Lastly, I express thanks to my father, the original Professor
Thaw, for encouraging and supporting me in the long processes both of completing the training
necessary to undertake this research and of completing a doctoral dissertation.
** This material is based in part upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security under Grant Award Number 2006 CS 001-000001, under the auspices of the Institute for
Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) research program. The I3P is managed by Dartmouth
College. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not
be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, the I3P, or Dartmouth College.
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state legislatures. My analysis suggests that a blend of these two
modes of regulating is superior to either method alone.
Federal regulation of cybersecurity through HIPAA, GrammLeach-Bliley, and the Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement
heavily involves private organizations subject to the regulation in the
establishment of the actual practices and standards to which those
organizations are held. By contrast, the state cybersecurity laws—a
form of disclosure-based regulation that de facto achieves directive
regulation—detail specific standards developed without industry
input.
This Article compares the efficacy of those two modes of
regulating using a mixed-methods empirical approach. Qualitative
data based on interviews with Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) at leading multinational corporations details the practical
effects of how regulation drives cybersecurity practices. Analysis of
quantitative data describing security breach incidents reveals that a
blend of the two types of regulation is substantially more effective at
preventing such incidents than is either method alone. These results
provide insight into ways to mitigate the risks of deliberate regulatory
capture while still leveraging the unique knowledge private entities
have about what are the most salient cybersecurity threats and
defenses.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, while driving back from a job interview in
Washington, D.C., I recall receiving (on my hands-free-enabled
mobile phone) an “urgent” phone call from the issuing bank of my
primary credit card. Upon returning the call, I learned that my credit
card had been compromised and a new card needed to be issued—
immediately. As a young cybersecurity scholar, I was curious and,
inquiring further, was able to learn only that one of the payment
processors with which the bank worked had experienced a massive
security breach, and it was under investigation.
In 2008, payment card processor Heartland Payment Systems
experienced a security breach1 that resulted in the compromise of
approximately 130 million consumer payment card records.2 The
compromise was the result of malicious software placed into
Heartland’s network that extracted the data describing payment card
transactions and transmitted that information, including sensitive

1. Paul McNamara, Banks Warn Customers as Debit-Card Processor Acknowledges
Breach . . . ”Larger than TJX?”, NETWORKWORLD (Jan. 20, 2009, 10:03 AM), http://www.network
world.com/community/node/37510.
2. Incident 1518, DATALOSSDB, http://www.datalossdb.org/incidents/1518-malicious-softwarehack-compromises-unknown-number-of-credit-cards-at-fifth-largest-credit-card-processor (source
requires registration to view).
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financial account information, to an outside hacker.3 The aftereffects
of this breach included a substantial federal lawsuit and settlement
fund,4 substantial negative media coverage, and millions of
customers (including the author) having to go through the process of
waiting for a new card to arrive, checking statements for fraudulent
transactions, and updating their information with vendors and
automatic payment systems.5 All because a vendor of very substantial
size failed to employ reasonable security measures that could have
prevented the hacker.
Cybersecurity is a complex topic in itself. Cybersecurity
regulation, a topic of substantial policy and media attention over the
past several years,6 involves a complex mixture of state and federal
regulation including varying regulatory approaches and varying
degrees of scope. This Article seeks to accomplish three tasks: 1)
describe the existing framework of cybersecurity regulation and
contextualize that framework within existing scholarship on
regulation,7 2) present the results of a mixed-methods empirical study
evaluating the efficacy of the various regulatory approaches currently
in use,8 and 3) discuss how particular innovations in cybersecurity
regulation result in a new, hybrid form of regulation not yet welldescribed in the literature.9
Unpacking “cybersecurity regulation” begins first with
understanding to what the term “cybersecurity” refers. Cybersecurity
and cyber-attack are increasingly common terms in public discourse,
but there is surprising disagreement as to what precisely they refer.
The terms are too-often used broadly to include all of electronic
crimes,10 military action,11 domestic guard/homeland security
3. Brian Krebs, Payment Processor Breach May Be Largest Ever, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2009, 1:30
PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/01/payment_processor_breach_may_b.html?
hpid=topnews.
4. See supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. See generally infra notes 10–15.
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.
8. See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Requirement,
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activities,12 corporate risk management,13 financial security,14 and a
wide spectrum of other activities related to computers, the Internet,
privacy, and other similar topics.15 I do not suggest the term is
misapplied to any of these topics, but rather that more precise terms
would be helpful. To that end, for the purposes of this Article, I
discuss those aspects of cybersecurity which refer to the information
security measures16 that custodians of consumer data17 take to protect
such sensitive information. Thus the scope of this Article is private
law and regulation, and uses the term information security to describe
those administrative, technical, and physical methods and practices

103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 909 (2013).
11. Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command in Review
of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program,
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of Gen. Keith B.
Alexander, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733855.
12. Jennifer Martinez, Senators Introduce Bill to Create Teams of Cyber Guardsmen at State-Level,
THE HILL (Mar. 22, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/289931senators-introduce-bill-to-create-teams-of-cyber-guards-at-state-level.
13. See, e.g., Defining the Future of Security and Risk, CSO40 SECURITY CONFAB + AWARDS
http://www.csoconfab.com/ehome/index.php?eventid=48220&tabid=95096&categoryid=345082&disco
untcode=NLP& (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (describing generally the CSO40 conference of April 2–3,
2013 on “Defining the Future of Security and Risk”).
14. Antone Gonsalves, Largest Banks Under Constant Cyberattack, Feds Say, CSO ONLINE (Nov. 2,
2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/720584/largest-banks-under-constant-cyberattack-feds-say.
15. See generally Digital Spotlight: Cybersecurity, CSO, Feb.–Mar. 2013, available at
http://resources.idgenterprise.com/original/AST-0082567_FEB4digi_0214i.pdf.
16. As noted by Professor Andrea Matwyshyn, “[r]eferring to all of information security,
particularly in private sector contexts, as ‘cybersecurity’ is technically incorrect.” Andrea M.
Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795,
817, n.99 (2013). Matwyshyn describes this misnomer as ignoring the aspects of physical security
inherent in “holistic” protection of data maintained by an enterprise. Id. I concur with this assessment,
and further suggest, as consistent with the Administrative/Technical/Physical breakdown described in
Part II.B.3 of this Article, that such a characterization also overlooks the administrative aspects involved
in protecting and securing information. See also Thaw, supra note 10, at 928 n.88 (discussing the
distinction between purely-technical restrictions on computer usage and comprehensive administrative,
technical, and physical restrictions thereon).
17. Generally, sensitive consumer data has been defined by federal and state statutes to include
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), sensitive financial information, Protected Health Information
(PHI), and certain other information subject to specific privacy protections (e.g., educational records of
students). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4) (2012) (defining “nonpublic personal [financial] information”);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.80(e) (West 2012) (defining “Personal information”); In re TJX Cos., No. C4227, 2008 WL 3150421, at *1 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2008) (defining “personal information” using language
commonly found in similar FTC Consent Orders addressing privacy and information security issues); 45
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining “protected health information”).
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involved in maintaining the regulatory standards imposed on private
data custodians.
This Article introduces the concept of Management-Based
Regulatory Delegation.18 Cybersecurity presents an uncommon
challenge in that the regulated entities—the private sector data
custodians described above—not only generally possess expertise
useful to the rulemaking process, but in fact possess superior
knowledge regarding information security threats and defenses not
otherwise available to regulators. Federal regulators leverage this
knowledge not only voluntarily, but in some cases by mandate,
engaging private entities in the rulemaking and de facto standardssetting processes.19 Scholars variously have referred to this as a form
of regulatory delegation.20 In addition to including regulated entities
at the proverbial “drafting table,”21 regulators also engage in a
process of management-based regulation under which the regulated
entities themselves develop and adhere to their own individualized
compliance plans.22 While these plans must meet general guidelines,
the regulatory goal becomes the development of and adherence to the
plan, rather than compliance with specific technical obligations,
directly.23 Scholars have referred to this process by several names;24
18. Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is a mode of regulation under which administrative
agencies, through legislative-mandated collaboration with regulatory stakeholders, promulgate
regulations requiring regulated entities to develop plans designed to achieve certain aspirational goals
laid out by the legislature. As discussed in Part II.B, Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is a
combination of management-based regulation, in which administrative agencies promulgate
requirements that regulated entities then develop, with regulatory delegation. Regulatory delegation is
defined as a process in which administrative agencies enlist the expertise of the particular regulated
party. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L. J. 377, 386 (2006).
19. As discussed in Part II.B.3, adjudication by the Federal Trade Commission through settlements
of its enforcement actions creates effective cybersecurity standards that currently are viewed by
practitioners as having a prospective regulatory effect.
20. E.g., Bamberger, supra note 18, at 385–86.
21. This is a level of engagement by regulated entities and other interested parties far in excess of
anything required by informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act and possibly even
exceeding that required under formal rulemaking guidelines. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). While such a
discussion is outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting.
22. See generally infra notes 43, 84.
23. See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 386.
24. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
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this Article addresses it as management-based regulation. The net
result of combining these two forms of regulation is what I describe
as Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, a deliberate encoding
of regulatory capture—both in the rulemaking and enforcement
stages of the administrative process—to engage the superior
knowledge possessed by regulated entities. And, indeed, the Chief
Information Security Officers (CISOs) interviewed as part of this
study describe how they participated in these processes most
particularly with respect to the HIPAA Security Rule.25
I evaluate the efficacy of cybersecurity regulation by comparing
the ability of those industries subject to Management-Based
Regulatory Delegation models with those subject only to more
directive regulatory models at preventing security breaches of
sensitive consumer information. The latter category, which I describe
as directive regulation, also presents an interesting finding in that the
“directive” component results from an information disclosure-based
regulation with a “safe harbor” provision that effectively becomes a
directive mandate to employ the safe harbor.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I contextualizes
cybersecurity regulation within the existing scholarship on regulatory
frameworks and identifies how those frameworks fail to describe
cybersecurity regulation adequately.26 Part II provides a descriptive
account of a new hybrid form of regulation emerging in cybersecurity
and proposes an alternate framework for categorizing regulation.27
Using this framework, it divides existing cybersecurity regulation
into two categories for comparative analysis. Part III presents the
results of a quantitative study of security breach incidence which
suggests that blending traditional directive regulation with
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 692 n.1 (2003) (describing
management-based regulation as a concept variously referred to as “‘enforced self-regulation’
(Braithwaite 1982), ‘mandated self-regulation’ (Bardach & Kagan 1982; Rees 1988), ‘reflexive’
regulation (Orts 1995), or ‘process-based’ (Gunningham & Grabosky 1998) and ‘systems-based’
(Gunningham 1996; Gunningham & Johnstone 1999) standards”).
25. See infra Part IV.B.2.
26. See discussion infra Part I.
27. See discussion infra Part II.
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Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is superior at breach
prevention than is either method alone.28 Part IV provides a practical
account of the effects of each type of regulation from the views of
CISOs and suggests how blending the two modes of regulating can
offset the various weaknesses inherent within each mode alone.29
I. DEVELOPING A THEORY OF REGULATORY CLASSIFICATION
Information security laws have not yet been classified in the
literature on regulation. Understanding these laws’ character and
function is critical to evaluating their efficacy and considering both
how to improve them and what lessons they may have for regulation
in other industrial sectors.
Information security regulation is unique at the federal level in that
it heavily involves private parties both in the creation of standards
and in the adherence to those standards through individualized
compliance plans.30 This blend, which I describe as ManagementBased Regulatory Delegation, is a combination of theories advanced
on regulatory delegation31 and management-based regulation.32
A. A Brief Summary of Information Security Regulations
I discuss the various information security regulations considered in
this Article in more depth later when developing a method of
classifying those regulations for empirical comparison. Situating this
work within the existing literature does, however, require some
reference to these laws and regulations, and I provide here a brief
overview of the main pieces of the information security regulatory
puzzle.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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1. Federal Information Security Regulation
Information security regulation at the federal level comprises three
primary components. The first, respecting the financial sector, is the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).33 GLBA provides both the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and various agencies within or
associated with the Department of the Treasury authority to
promulgate and enforce regulations regarding information security
measures financial institutions must employ to protect the sensitive
information they maintain on behalf of consumers.34 GLBA
mandates a certain level of involvement by specific parties who must
be consulted during the rulemaking process.35
The second, respecting the healthcare sector, is the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),36 which
provides the Department of Health and Human Services the authority
to promulgate and enforce regulations regarding information security
measures healthcare entities and their associates must employ to
protect the sensitive information they maintain on behalf of patients,
research subjects, and individuals whose medical information they
collect/maintain.37
Finally, the third component is the enforcement “jurisprudence” of
the FTC under its “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” authority
pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC Act.38 Under this authority, the FTC
has engaged in a variety of enforcement actions asserting that various
information security practices of entities subject to its jurisdiction
were unfair, deceptive, or both, in that they failed to employ

33. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29
U.S.C.).
34. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6804, 6805 (2012).
35. Id. § 6804(a)(2).
36. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(1) (2006).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
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reasonable information security measures to protect the sensitive
personal information of those entities’ consumers.39
2. State Information Security Regulation
At the state level, legislatures beginning in 2003 passed laws
requiring entities losing control (experiencing security breaches) of
certain “personal information” describing individuals to notify those
individuals (and sometimes state regulatory authorities) of the
breach, unless the data lost was encrypted.40 As of August 2012,
forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands have such laws.41 This “encryption safe harbor,”
under which an organization is exempt from disclosure if the data
were encrypted, has the effect of transforming an information
disclosure-based regulatory regime into a directive regulatory regime
de facto requiring organizations to encrypt sensitive consumer data.42
3. Other Information Security Regulations
It is worth noting to the reader that other information security
regulations exist, both at the state and federal level, addressing
protection of consumer information and the responsibilities of private
entities. These include information security regulations promulgated
by the Internal Revenue Service, by the Massachusetts Department of
Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation, and laws passed by
various states concerning maintenance and disposal of consumer
information. Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have promulgated
regulations and issued guidance concerning the information security

39. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2013).
41. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Dec.
26, 2013).
42. See infra Part IV.
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of contractors with which the DoD does business and the disclosures
publicly-traded companies should make to investors.
The interviews with CISOs, my professional experience, and my
impression of my current and former colleagues’ experiences in this
regard all suggest that these “ancillary” regulations do not (yet) have
a substantial impact on information security practices respecting
consumer data. Thus at least at this stage of research, they are outside
the scope of consideration. I include them here for the reader’s
general information.
B. Coglianese and Lazer’s Model
Cary Coglianese and David Lazer propose that regulatory models
can be grouped into three discrete categories based on the stage in an
organization’s production process at which the regulation attempts to
intervene.43 They suggest that intervention may occur when planning
production (“planning stage”), implementing production (“acting
stage”), or determining the final outputs of production (“output
stage”).44 Each of these stages, according to the Coglianese and Lazer
model, corresponds to a different type of regulation. The sections that
follow discuss these stages in detail.
As defined by Coglianese and Lazer, technology-based regulation
is an approach in which regulatory standards govern the means of
production.45 Occurring at the implementation (or “acting”) stage, it
specifies technologies that must be employed or processes that must
be followed.46 Technology-based regulation in the pollution control
context, for example, could specify certain types of emissions control
technologies that must be employed. In the information security
context, technology-based regulation could specify that custodians of
sensitive personal information must employ specific security

43.
44.
45.
46.

Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693–94.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id.
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measures such as anti-virus and anti-malware software on their
systems.
Performance-based regulation is an approach in which regulatory
standards govern the final state or result of a production process.47
Occurring at the output stage, regulation of this form specifies the
characteristics of products or services that must be achieved or
avoided. Unlike technology-based regulation, performance-based
approaches are generally agnostic as to the means by which the
producer achieves the specified goal. Performance-based regulation
in the pollution control context, for example, could specify limits on
the quantity of pollutants a manufacturing facility could release into
the atmosphere. In the information security context, performancebased regulation could specify that entities retaining payment card
information must not lose control of (e.g., have stolen) consumers’
payment account information.
Management-based regulation is an approach in which regulatory
standards address conditions that must be met during the planning
stage of a productive process—before manufacture of a product or
provision of a service begins.48 It most commonly requires
organizations to conduct risk assessments, produce risk management
plans, or both.49 Unlike technology-based regulation or performancebased regulation, management-based regulation does not begin from
a premise of requiring an organization to engage in a pre-specified
process or achieve a pre-specified goal. Rather, it mandates the
undertaking of a general type of process (e.g., a risk assessment) and
possibly adherence to the results of that process (e.g., a risk
management plan). Management-based regulation may even specify
general areas that these analyses and plans must address. The
47. Id.
48. Id. at 694–95.
49. As noted by Coglianese and Lazer, management-based regulation may also require organizations
to implement and adhere to the risk management plans they develop. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note
24, at 707–11. Such requirements structurally overlap both with technology-based regulation and with
performance-based regulation in that they effectively specify approaches that must be employed and end
conditions that must be achieved. The specifications of these technology and performance requirements
will obviously differ as the organizations self-define the guidelines.
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“compliance” element, however, is the actual development of the
plan and the “compliance details” are specified by the organization
(through its analyses/plans) rather than by the regulator.
Management-based regulation in the pollution control context
could, for example, require that manufacturing plants conduct
analyses to determine their current levels of pollutants and develop
plans to reduce those levels. In the information security context,
management-based regulation could require that organizations
maintaining sensitive personal information conduct risk analyses of
their information systems and develop risk management plans to
reduce the probability of those systems being compromised and
individuals’ sensitive information being lost.
Coglianese and Lazer’s model focuses heavily on the timing of
regulatory intervention as the spectrum along which classes of
regulation are differentiated.50 It strictly links the timing of regulatory
intervention to the functional method of regulation. The resultant
typology is incomplete for the purpose of classifying information
security regulation.
C. The Role of “Timing”
To understand the ways in which Coglianese and Lazer’s typology
overlooks certain types (and potential types)51 of information security
regulation, it is first necessary to understand what constitutes a
security “good” or “output.” Coglianese and Lazer define outputs in
the context of traditional industrial production.52 They consider
outputs to “include both private and social goods, that is, saleable
products or services (private goods) as well as the positive and
negative externalities (social goods and bads) that affect society.”53
50. See generally Coglianese & Lazier, supra note 24.
51. Discussing “potential types” of information security regulation is critical at this juncture both
because the existing regulation only addresses the protection of certain types of information and because
there are strong indications that federal regulators consider this to be a critical and urgent issue.
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011).
52. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693.
53. Id.
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Unlike traditional industrial production involving the manufacture
of physical products (e.g., foodstuffs) or the provision of professional
services (e.g., management consulting services), information security
does not have well-defined “outputs” of the type described above. In
traditional industries, these well-defined outputs come into being at
an end stage in the production lifecycle as a result of steps designed
to result in the desired output.54 In the context of information
security, the state of keeping an information system secure can be
considered a good or service. A single security violation, however,
does not mean the “good” has not been produced or the “service” not
delivered. Information security, as identified by several respondents,
is an exercise in risk mitigation, not risk prevention.55 Thus, many of
the deliverable “goods” or “services” are defined by engaging in
activities that are likely, but not guaranteed, to mitigate system
compromise.56 It is therefore the act of engaging in those activities,
not the result of the activities themselves, that constitutes the output
for information security. Understanding this distinction between
traditional goods and information security is critical to understanding
how to evaluate information security regulation.
A second critical difference is the means by which success or
failure is evaluated. Coglianese and Lazer consider three industrial
activities as examples in discussing their typology: food safety,
pollution, and industrial safety.57 Information security does
somewhat resemble these traditional areas in that each of them is
associated with producing a physical good, rather than being the
primary object of production themselves.58 Unlike these three
54. See id. Figure 1 at 694.
55. Most of the CISOs interviewed described their job and the task of information security as risk
management. One CISO, for example, even went so far as to describe their job as “[r]isk management,
not security at all.” David Bernard Thaw, Characterizing, Classifying, and Understanding Information
Security Laws and Regulations: Considerations for Policymakers and Organizations Protecting Sensitive
Information Assets 8, n.16 (Spring 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file
with Georgia State University Law Review).
56. Id. at 8.
57. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 696–700 (discussing authors’ typology).
58. Thaw, supra note 55, at 8 n.18 (“Information security is, in large part, a process/procedure/goal
(to protect assets) associated with some other productive activity.”).
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categories, however, information security lacks well-defined metrics
by which to evaluate outcomes.59 The lack of well-defined metrics
makes it difficult to evaluate information security outcomes strictly at
the output stage.
Professionals and regulators evaluate information security
outcomes as a function of whether certain practices are followed, not
whether those practices are effective. This approach is, in part, due to
an inability to measure the efficacy of such practices because
demonstrating success is often an exercise in “proving a negative.”60
As a result, the characteristics used to evaluate “success” in
information security reside not only at the output stage, but also at
the acting and planning stages of Coglianese and Lazer’s typology. In
the case of environmental pollution, for example, success ultimately
can be evaluated by measuring a well-defined output condition—
what pollutants are (or are not) released. In the information security
context, by contrast, the lack of a successful attack does not indicate
that security measures were effective—exploitable system
vulnerabilities simply may not have come under attack during the
evaluation period. Thus the measure of success61 is not always
directly linked to a goal or output in the traditional sense, and goals
and outputs, therefore, must be considered more broadly with respect
to information security. Specifically, as it pertains to this section,
such breadth includes considering outputs to exist both at the
planning and at the acting stages of Coglianese and Lazer’s typology.
The refinements I propose address this disconnect by redefining the
final stage of production to include outputs that occur

59. Id. at 8 n.19 (“Several of the CISO respondents lamented the lack of available metrics
particularly as it pertained to justifying information security expenditures to management.”).
60. Id. at 8 n.22 (“A few of the CISO respondents specifically expressed part of the difficulty in their
job being the process of proving to management that resources allocated to information security were
well-spent given the lack of something occurring—essentially placing them in the position of having to
‘prove a negative.’”).
61. Id. at 9 n.23 (differentiating the measure of success “from the measure of compliance, which can
be measured at all three stages in the industrial production cycle—a fact obviously central to Coglianese
and Lazer’s analysis”).
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chronologically at other stages, but are information security
outcomes as defined in this section.
I discuss this concept, which I call the Information Security
Production Lifecycle, in the section that follows. Understanding the
role of timing is critical to understanding the shortcomings of
Coglianese and Lazer’s typology for categorizing information
security regulation. Understanding timing in this context requires
understanding how the Information Security Production Lifecycle
differs from the production lifecycle for more traditional goods. The
section that follows identifies these differences, thereby setting up the
background to discuss the specific shortcomings of Coglianese and
Lazer’s typology.
1. The Information Security Production Lifecycle (ISPL)62
Information security has the interesting characteristic of being both
an economic good and a process of producing that good. It is a good
in the sense of providing definable (and sometimes measurable)
outcomes. The process of producing these outcomes, however, is also
an element of information security. In other examples, such as
manufactured products, the process to produce the product is distinct
from the product itself and may employ technologies unrelated to the
final product. Information security differs in that elements of the
productive process to achieve information security outcomes are also
elements of the outcomes themselves.
Put differently, the means of reaching an information security
outcome are as much an information security “product” as is the
outcome itself. For example, an information security outcome may be
to reduce the incidence of computers being hijacked for use in a
“botnet,”63 and a means for achieving that outcome may be the
deployment of system security software including anti-virus software
with heuristic detection. The deployment of such software is also a
62. The text accompanying this part is largely attributable to Thaw, supra note 55, at 7–12.
63. Botnet Definition, TECH TERMS COMPUTER DICTIONARY, http://www.techterms.com/definition/
botnet (last updated June 9, 2010).
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recognized information security goal, or “product,” independent of
the organization’s specific focus on countering a particular or general
threat of machine hijack.64
In the following three sections, I propose a friendly refinement to
the stages of production examined by Coglianese and Lazer. The
purpose of this refinement (and renaming) is specific to information
security and to industries that may resemble its production
characteristics.65
a. Design/Planning Stage
The design and planning stage is that point in the ISPL when
decisions about how to implement information security measures are
made. Coglianese and Lazer refer to this as the “planning” stage in
organizational production and that stage at which management-based
regulation is targeted.66 Many of the characteristics they associate
with management-based regulation are applicable to the design and
planning stage defined here. As applied to information security,
however, their model does not anticipate planning activities that
require specific implementation choices, whereas the effects of some
information security regulations do require that such decisions be
made at the planning stage.67 This differs from Coglianese and
Lazer’s conception of management-based regulation, which they
describe as “shar[ing] some of the advantages of performance-based
regulation in that it allows firms the flexibility to choose their own
control or prevention strategies.”68
64. INT’L INFO. SYS. SEC. CERTIFICATION CONSORTIUM, CERTIFIED INFORMATION SYSTEMS
SECURITY PROFESSIONAL CANDIDATE INFORMATION BULLETIN 18 (2012) (noting that preventing or
responding to “attacks (e.g., malicious code, zero-day exploit, denial of service)” and “[i]mplement[ing]
and support[ing] patch and vulnerability management” are critical to security operations).
65. The following should not be interpreted to suggest that the stages of production examined by
Coglianese and Lazer should be refined in the context of traditional industries; in fact, as of the time of
this writing I have not yet identified any other industries bearing the characteristics of information
security that suggest these refinements.
66. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693–94.
67. See, e.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2013).
68. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 702; Thaw, supra note 55, at 10 n.28 (“[M]anagementbased regulation mandates that firms engage in planning activities but does not specify how those
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b. Implementation/Maintenance Stage
The implementation and maintenance stage is that portion of the
ISPL encompassing activities giving effect to security measures,
responding to security incidents/events, and other activities related to
the deployment and upkeep of security plans. This includes the
implementation and maintenance not only of technical security
measures, but also of administrative and physical security measures
as well. Coglianese and Lazer refer to this as the acting stage.69 In
their typology, it is that stage at which technology-based regulation is
targeted.70
c. Efficacy/Output Stage
The Efficacy/Output Stage is that portion of the ISPL
encompassing definable outcomes. I suggest that such definable
outcomes are used to evaluate success at, and exist at, all three stages
of the ISPL. These outcomes include both: (1) procedural outcomes
or those as steps taken to mitigate risk; and (2) measurable outcomes
or those for which an external metric can evaluate success.71
Together, these two categories define the Efficacy/Output Stage.
This is markedly different from Coglianese and Lazer’s approach,
which considers the output stage (as they call it) to be that stage of
production in which outputs (both good and bad) come into being.72
Outputs in traditional industries come into being at the end of a
production cycle as the result of some process or steps designed to

activities must implement mechanisms to achieve regulatory goals.”) (emphasis in original).
69. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 694.
70. Id.
71. Thaw, supra note 55, at 11 n.30 (“‘External metric’ in this context refers to something not an
element of the information security process, such as a data breach, electronic break-in, network
compromise, or other failure of security. It can also represent positive outcomes, such as the successful
detection of and defense against an attack, or the investigation of an incident and apprehension of the
perpetrator of that incident. This distinction is important as it highlights the difference between
traditional outcomes (appropriate to be measured and examined at the output/efficacy stage) and
information security outcomes which, as discussed above . . . exist at all stages of the ISPL.”) (emphasis
in original).
72. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693–94.
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result in those outputs. In the context of information security, I argue
that many outputs are the actual process or steps themselves, and
come into being chronologically before the “end” stage of
production.
The deployment of system security software, for example, is a
recognized procedural outcome that occurs chronologically at the
Design/Planning (as to software selection) and Implementation/
Maintenance (as to operation/updating) Stages. For the purposes of
characterizing certain regulation, however, it makes sense to consider
this goal as an outcome rather than as a process to achieve an
outcome. The choice of approach will depend on the structure of, and
purpose behind, the regulation. A regulation that seeks to implement
system security software to achieve some other specific goal, such as
the protection of personal information, suggests treating the
deployment of system security software as a process, not an outcome.
A regulation that seeks to implement system security software to
mitigate negative externalities caused by the absence of that software,
however, suggests treating the deployment of such software as an
outcome. This distinction, while perhaps overly fine, is important in
characterizing the function of information security regulation and is
thus a necessary refinement to Coglianese and Lazer’s approach.
Measurable outcomes are the result of processes or steps. The most
straightforward example is security incidents. While these are
negative outcomes, they are definable, measurable events. These
types of occurrences are always outcomes and more closely align
with the traditional concept of production outputs. Measurable
outcomes and procedural outcomes together define the
Efficacy/Output Stage for the purposes of characterizing information
security regulation.
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D. Coglianese and Lazer’s Model is Incomplete
First, technology-based regulation is under-inclusive. By linking
strictly to regulation of methods and means at the production stage,73
Coglianese and Lazer’s conception of technology-based regulation
ignores regulatory instruments that address methods and means, but
do so at a different stage of the production cycle. Consider a case
where the technology is itself the output of the productive process. If
the “good” in question is an authentication mechanism to allow
accountholders electronic access to their financial accounts,
regulatory intervention governing the final output product would
regulate “technology” as much as would regulations aimed at the
process of developing the authentication mechanism. To be sure, the
latter is a necessary part of information security regulation, and as
identified by the International Information Systems Security
Certification Consortium ((ISC)2), security considerations must be a
part of the software development life cycle.74 However, to limit the
term “technology-based regulation” only to those events occurring
during production fails to capture fully the ways in which technology
may be regulated.
Second, performance-based regulation fails to consider
circumstances where the target of the regulation is output conditions,
but aspects of the regulation’s mechanism produce an effect
regulating technology or means during the production stage. Perhaps
the most notable examples of this phenomenon are the Security
Breach Notification (SBN) statutes, which led to the rapid adoption
of technologies to encrypt sensitive personal information stored on
removable or portable media.75 This adoption appears largely to
result, as discussed in Part III, from provisions in most jurisdictions’

73. Id. at 693–95.
74. INT’L INFO. SYS. SEC. CERTIFICATION CONSORTIUM, supra note 64, at 12 (noting that “[s]ecurity
of the software environment”—including “[o]peration and maintenance” and “[c]hange management”—
are essential components of “security in the software development life cycle”).
75. Thaw, supra note 55, at 13, 105–06.
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SBN statutes providing “safe harbors” from notification requirements
if the compromised or lost data was encrypted.76
Third, Coglianese and Lazer’s typology ties management-based
regulation to the planning stage of production. Unlike with
technology-based or production-based regulation, Coglianese and
Lazer’s typology does consider some regulatory activity outside the
planning stage. Specifically, they consider that management-based
regulation may mandate both planning activities and implementation
of the activities specified by the plan.77 This distinction is important,
and allows their typology to consider forms of regulation like
HIPAA, which mandate both that Covered Entities develop security
plans and that they adhere to those plans.78
Enforcement such as that by the FTC however, as discussed in
greater detail in Part II, presents a hybrid model of managementbased regulation not captured by Coglianese and Lazer’s typology.
FTC enforcement actions result both in specific compliance orders
and in a requirement to conduct regular information security (and/or
privacy) assessments.79 Unlike the assessments conceived under
traditional management-based regulation, FTC-ordered assessments
are reactive in nature instead of proactive.80 Furthermore, the
effective goals of those assessments are tied ex ante (the assessment)
to those specific compliance objectives.81
The effective result is a hybrid style of management-based
regulation involving assessments which begin from a different
chronological point than described by Coglianese and Lazer’s
traditional model. Additionally, these consent decrees have a broader
effect, as the specific compliance elements thereof often are
considered to become de facto regulations to which other firms are
subject, as discussed further below in Part II.82
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 706.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(1) (2006).
See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E. Reconsidering Regulatory Classification for Information Security
Certain information security regulatory structures rely on a
fundamental concept of “reasonable security.”83 This concept, not
unlike other forms of regulation, presumes that a one-size-fits-all
approach to regulating is not optimal84 and looks to the regulated
industrial sectors (and their constituent entities) to exercise some
professional judgment as to what choices are reasonable to meet the
compliance requirements of the regulations. HIPAA and GLBA are
the two most prevalent examples of this type of regulation in the
information security space.
The concept described above bears general resemblance to
Coglianese and Lazer’s conception of management-based regulation.
However, as discussed above, their definition fails to adequately
capture the character of these laws for the purposes of understanding
information security regulation. Part II discusses an alternate
approach to understanding HIPAA and GLBA (respectively). This
groundwork explains what HIPAA and GLBA are—regulatory
frameworks that seek input from industry professionals in the
establishment of their regulations. To fully understand the effects of
this style of regulation on the organization, it is necessary to
distinguish these frameworks from other regulatory frameworks with
an apparently similar notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
I propose considering regulation in three categories: (1) traditional
legislation that is merely directive, and does not provide rulemaking
authority to administrative agencies;85 (2) legislation that delegates
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies but does not specify
deference to industry;86 and (3) legislation that delegates rulemaking
authority to administrative agencies and specifies that those agencies
must consult with industry stakeholders during the rulemaking
83. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 1173(d), 100 Stat. 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2006)).
84. See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 387 (“One-size-fits-all rules cannot easily account for the ways
in which risk manifests itself differently across firms.”).
85. See discussion infra Part I.E.1.
86. See discussion infra Part I.E.2.
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process and in some cases must defer to industry standards.87 The
first category describes regulation, as discussed in Part IV, that
interferes with the exercise of professional discretion by information
security professionals. The third category describes regulation that
encourages reliance on the discretion of information security
professionals.
1. Directive Legislation
Directive legislation is that which does not involve a rulemaking
process by an administrative or other agency. The legislation itself
establishes (usually straightforward) standards governing regulated
entities and leaves no details to administrative agencies. Two
examples of such legislation are the Video Privacy Protection Act
(VPPA)88 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).89
The VPPA specifies limitations on the disclosure of personally
identifiable information90 of consumers who rent, purchase, or
subscribe to other goods and services from a video tape service
provider.91 The restriction is straightforward, and the statute neither
prescribes any rulemaking authority nor references the involvement
of an administrative agency in the regulatory process.
ECPA operates in a similar fashion. It makes the unlawful
interception92 of wire communications a felony93 and specifies
precisely what constitutes unlawful interception and what exceptions
exist.94 Like the VPPA, ECPA neither prescribes rulemaking
87. See discussion infra Part I.E.3.
88. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–11 (Supp. 2013)).
89. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–11 (2012)).
90. Interestingly, the VPPA provides one of the earlier definitions of “personally identifiable
information”—one that far predated those codified in SBNs. The VPPA’s definition is simple but
ambiguous, “includ[ing] information which identifies a person as having . . . obtained specific video
materials or services from a video tape service provider[.]” Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988
§ 2.a.2(3).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (Supp. 2013).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012).
93. Id. § 2511(4)(a).
94. Id. § 2511(2).
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authority for any administrative agency—even the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)—nor references the
involvement of any such agency, except as to referencing previously
existing FCC rules for descriptive purposes.95
SBNs, which I discuss extensively in Part II, also bear this
character. They share a common framework of describing a
triggering condition, which if met requires notification of a loss of
control of certain types of personal information, unless certain
exceptions (e.g., the data was encrypted) apply.96 With the exception
of deferment to law enforcement agencies as to delaying notification
obligations, these statutes generally do not involve administrative
agencies at all. When they do, it is generally limited to a centralized
reporting requirement and not a rulemaking component. This type of
regulation has substantial implications for information security
professionalism in organizations as discussed in detail in Part IV.
2. Traditional Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
The traditional “notice-and-comment” rulemaking process is one
with which regulatory practitioners would likely be familiar.
Congress crafts legislation specifying general goals, and directs an
administrative agency to engage in a “rulemaking” process to fill in
the details.97 The agency publishes notices to this effect in the
Federal Register, inviting the public (and more specifically,
interested parties) to submit comments.98 The agency then considers
these comments and drafts regulations pursuant to the authority
granted to it by Congress.99 It publishes those regulations and their
effective date in the Code of Federal Regulations, and after the
effective date, entities subject to the regulations are responsible for
compliance therewith.100
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Many regulations across a wide variety of substantive fields follow
this model. In the consumer/privacy regulatory space, two notable
examples are the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA)101 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).102 COPPA,
for example, specifies that the FTC shall implement regulations to
ensure various protections with respect to children’s usage of
websites.103
These regulations require the FTC to, subject to the requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),104 promulgate
regulations to achieve the intent specified above. The APA does not
specifically require the FTC (or any other federal agency) to defer to
the judgment of private industry or professionals in the promulgation
of those rules. FCRA has similar requirements.105
Delegating these responsibilities to the FTC (and other financial
regulatory agencies) makes sense. Developing rules for consumer
notification procedures is a core competency of the Commission.106
Likewise, developing rules governing the use of consumer reports
and related financial information is a core competency of the
Commission and the other financial regulatory agencies referenced in
FCRA.107
On the surface, HIPAA and GLBA appear to fit this model. There
is, however, a fine but critical difference between the way in which
this process was implemented with respect to HIPAA and GLBA as

1673, 1683–88, 1775 n.500 (providing a thorough discussion of the administrative agency rulemaking
process, with specific relevant emphasis at the pages noted, and a critique of this process).
101. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2006)).
102. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-507, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681–81u (2006)).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b).
104. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 500–04 (2006)).
105. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(q)(3), 1681b(g)(5), 1681c(h)(2), 1681i(e)(4), 1681j(a)(1)(C)(i)
(providing various federal regulatory agencies’ rulemaking authority and prescribing mandatory
rulemaking processes that those agencies must engage in to fill in gaps not addressed specifically by
statute).
106. Thaw, supra note 55, at 26.
107. Id.
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compared to other traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
difference lies in Congress’s command to the regulatory agencies
with respect to the rulemaking process and the differences in the core
competencies of the relevant agencies at the time HIPAA and GLBA
were passed.108
3. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking with Deference to Industry
(Regulatory Delegation)
There is a fine but critical distinction between traditional noticeand-comment rulemaking under the APA and the rulemaking
requirements Congress established for HIPAA and GLBA. In each of
these cases, Congress specifically called out groups with whom the
administrative agencies promulgating the rules must consult.109
Those groups comprised representatives of industry and other key
stakeholders who, notably, did have privacy and information security
competencies that the respective HIPAA and GLBA agencies were
unlikely to have (at that time). Additionally, these stakeholders had
access to unique information about information security threats and
the efficacy of various defenses at addressing those threats likely
unique to the stakeholders and not otherwise readily available to the
regulators. In the case of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, for example,
Congress specifically required that: “(d) Consultation.—In carrying
out this section, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
consult with—(1) the National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistics established under section 306(k) of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k)); and (2) the Attorney General.”110 In

108. In the case of HIPAA, the Department of Health and Human Services; in the case of GLBA, the
federal financial regulatory agencies charged with its implementation. See infra note 204.
109. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(d), 110
Stat. 2033, 2034 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006)); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
110. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 264(d) (applying this consultation
requirement to the regulatory authority afforded HHS in § 264).
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the case of the HIPAA Security Rule,111 Congress’s command was
even more explicit:
In complying with the requirements of this part [which includes
§ 1173(d)], the Secretary shall rely on the recommendations of
the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics
established under section 242k(k) of this title [the Public Health
Service Act], and shall consult with appropriate Federal and
State agencies and private organizations. The Secretary shall
publish in the Federal Register any recommendation of the
National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics regarding the
adoption of a standard under this part.112

The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS)
comprises key stakeholders in the health and health information
policy fields from industry, government, and academia.113 The
current committee comprises
18 individuals distinguished in the fields of health statistics,
electronic interchange of health care information, privacy and
security of electronic information, population-based public
health, purchasing or financing health care services, integrated
computerized health information systems, health services
research, consumer interests in health information, health data
standards, epidemiology, and the provision of health services.114

111. § 1173(d), 110 Stat. at 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2006))
(authorizing regulations set forth at 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164). See infra notes 189–193.
112. § 1172(f), 110 Stat. at 2024 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(f) (2006)) (emphasis
added) (§ 1172(f) applies to HIPAA § 1173(d) per the specifications of HIPAA § 1172(c)(3)(A)(ii)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006))).
113. Nat’l Comm. on Vital & Health Statistics, Introduction to the NCVHS, NVCHS,
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/intro.htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2006). See also 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(2)
(2012).
114. Nat’l Comm. on Vital & Health Statistics, supra note 113. The full committee membership is
available online at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/members.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 2014).
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As noted above, the Committee is also responsible for assisting the
Secretary in promulgating rules relating to the HIPAA “Security
Rule,”115 which governs the information security requirements for the
interchange of health-related information.116
In the case of GLBA, Congress’s command is not as clear. The Act
requires that:
(b) . . . each [of the 8 GLBA regulators] shall establish
appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to their
jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards—
(1) to ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records
and information;
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of such records; and
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
records or information which could result in substantial harm or
inconvenience to any customer.117

It specifies that, with respect to rulemaking in this regard:
(1) Rulemaking
The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Securities and
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(5)(A)(iv)-(v), (vii) (requiring the Committee to “advise the Secretary” “with
respect to the design of and approval of health statistical and health information systems concerned with
the collection, processing, and tabulation of health statistics within the Department of Health and
Human Services, with respect to the Cooperative Health Statistics System established under subsection
(e) of this section, and with respect to the standardized means for the collection of health information
and statistics to be established by the Secretary under subsection (j)(1) of this section;” “to review and
comment on findings and proposals developed by other organizations and agencies and to make
recommendations for their adoption or implementation by local, State, national, or international
agencies;” and “to issue an annual report on the state of the Nation’s health, its health services, their
costs and distributions, and to make proposals for improvement of the Nation’s health statistics and
health information systems”).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012).
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Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission shall
each prescribe, after consultation as appropriate with
representatives of State insurance authorities designated by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
subchapter with respect to the financial institutions subject to
their jurisdiction under section 6805 of this title.
(2) Coordination, consistency, and comparability
Each of the agencies and authorities required under paragraph
(1) to prescribe regulations shall consult and coordinate with the
other such agencies and authorities for the purposes of assuring,
to the extent possible, that the regulations prescribed by each
such agency and authority are consistent and comparable with
the regulations prescribed by the other such agencies and
authorities.118

While this text does not explicitly require the involvement of
private industry groups, in practice the financial institutions regulated
by each of the above entities and the state insurance authorities work
closely with these regulators, particularly with respect to the
promulgation of new regulations.119 Furthermore, as alluded to
above, the core competency of these agencies (especially at the time
of GLBA’s enactment) was not information security. Financial
institutions, by contrast, had substantial incentive to invest in
information security, a fact revealed by the CISO interviews120 and
supported by the quantitative analysis below.121 As such, it seems
reasonable to expect that, although not explicitly mandated by
Congress, these agencies would actively seek the involvement of
industry stakeholders in a manner more similar to that required for
118.
119.
120.
121.

15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(1–2) (1999) (updated with some differences in language in 2011).
Thaw, supra note 55, at 29.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part III.
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HIPAA than that conducted with ordinary notice-and-comment
procedures under the APA.
In essence, we see in this final category a form of informal
rulemaking employing “Notice-and-Comment-Plus-Plus,” where not
only do the organic statutes require the administrative agencies to
engage more than the baseline requirements of § 553 of the APA, but
those statutes specifically encode regulatory capture of industry
stakeholders into the rulemaking process itself.
II. APPLYING THE MODEL TO INFORMATION SECURITY
The primary goal of this work is to develop a better understanding
of how information security regulations function and suggest ways to
improve security outcomes through regulation. The empirical
approaches discussed in Parts III and IV require that existing laws
and regulations be sufficiently grouped for the purposes of
comparison. Based on the theoretical framework developed in Part
I,122 this Part proposes grouping the most predominant existing
information security laws and regulations into two groups for the
purposes of analysis: (1) Directive Regulation;123 and (2)
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation.124
A. Directive Regulation
Directive Regulation comprises laws and/or regulations laying out
express performance standards and/or means of achieving
performance. This category of regulation is directive in nature,
122. This Part discusses, but does not rely upon, the timing component of each regulation in
developing the two regulatory groupings for empirical comparison. The nature of timing is such that
coupling it to the form of regulation may fail to consider more precise distinctions among information
security regulations. As of the time of this writing, while such precise distinctions do exist, there are an
insufficient number of regulatory models in place to allow empirically valid comparison among all
different models. If the trend of increasing regulation of information security practices continues, future
data may be sufficient to create more fine-grained comparisons among regulatory categories. In another
work, I propose a comprehensive model for such fine-grained categorization. See Thaw, supra note 55.
123. See discussion infra Part II.A.
124. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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traditionally is handled by legislatures (perhaps with limited, precise
delegation to administrative agencies),125 and generally involves the
specification either of means of performance or means of
achievement. In the context of information security, the various state
Security Breach Notification (SBN) laws are the predominant
example of this form of regulation.
SBN statutes are laws requiring an entity that loses control of
“personal information” it maintains about individuals to disclose that
loss to those individuals.126 As of May 2013, forty-six states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
had such laws.127 The original intent of these laws was to help
consumers protect themselves against identity theft by requiring data
custodians to notify individuals when a custodian lost control of
information that could facilitate identity theft.128 SBNs generally
specify what constitutes covered information, what are triggering
events, who must be notified of breaches, and under what exceptions
notification is unnecessary or may be delayed.129 Each jurisdiction’s
SBN provides an exception to reporting requirements under which—
if the data was encrypted—the entity need not report the event.130
To date, no state’s SBN statute involves a rulemaking process by
an administrative agency.131 Rather, the text of the statute fully
specifies all aspects of the notification requirements and
exemptions.132 In this regard, SBNs are directive legislation.
125. To the extent agencies promulgate regulations strictly to enforce specific legislative mandates
and without substantial exercise of agency discretion, such regulations may also fall into this category.
As of the time of writing, the author is unaware of any such examples of this model in the information
security regulatory context.
126. State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., CAL. ASSEMB., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1386, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (2002) (Senate
Third Reading and analysis of Saskia Kim).
129. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-910 to -912 (West 2007). For a list of all states with Security Breach
Notification laws, see State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41.
130. § 912.
131. The Massachusetts Data Security Standards do involve an administrative agency, but not as
respects the details of the breach notification requirement. These aspects are fully captured in the text of
the law passed by the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
93H, § 2 (2013).
132. Massachusetts’s statute does define the meaning of “encrypted” in its statutory text. MASS. GEN.
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On their face, SBNs appear to be traditional performance-based
regulations targeting the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL. The
aspect of SBNs relating to the condition they seek to prevent is best
characterized as performance-based regulation. It specifies a
condition—the loss of control of personal information—which is
undesirable and should be avoided. That condition is an outcome—
whether or not the “security” of a system has been breached133—and
is clearly measured at the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL.
Consider, for example, the following language from New York
State’s SBN:
Any person or business which conducts business in New York
state, and which owns or licenses computerized data which
includes private information134 shall disclose any breach of the
security of the system following discovery or notification of the
breach in the security of the system to any resident of New York
state whose private information was, or is reasonably believed to
have been, acquired by a person without valid authorization. The
disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs
of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision four of this
section, or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the
LAWS ch. 93H, § 1(a). It is worth noting that Massachusetts’s statute, unlike most other states’ SBNs,
does permit the Department of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulations to adopt regulations to
revise the definition of “encrypted.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1(b). However, it neither requires the
Department do so, nor does it appear that if the Department were to do so, that it would have anything
more than a marginal impact on the applicability of the statute.
133. “Breach” in this context refers to any compromise of administrative, technical, or physical
procedures resulting in the acquisition of information by an unauthorized party.
134. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(b) (McKinney 2013) (“‘Private information’ shall mean
personal information consisting of any information in combination with any one or more of the
following data elements, when either the personal information or the data element is not encrypted, or
encrypted with an encryption key that has also been acquired: (1) social security number; (2) driver’s
license number or non-driver identification card number; or (3) account number, credit or debit card
number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit
access to an individual’s financial account.”). For the definition of “personal information,” see § 899aa(1)(a) (“‘Personal information’ shall mean any information concerning a natural person which,
because of name, number, personal mark, or other identifier, can be used to identify such natural
person.”).
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breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the system.135

This statute essentially requires disclosure when any of an
individual’s social security number, driver’s license/non-driver
identification number, or financial account number in connection
with information that identifies that individual (e.g., their name) is
acquired by an unauthorized person as the result of a data breach.136
The focus here is on the “breach in the security of the system”
language that is used several times throughout the statute. This
language is the “triggering event” that results in the “penalty” aspect
of the regulation—requirements to notify individuals.137 Thus this
aspect of New York State’s SBN is best described as an “output” or
as relating to the effectiveness of the system, and thus is best
considered as part of the Output/Efficacy stage. Because the text of
the statute explicitly identifies this condition, it is best described as
targeting that condition, rather than generating an effect. The other
U.S. jurisdictions that have such laws use statutory language
producing an effect similar to that defined above.138 SBNs, therefore,
have the characteristic of being performance-based regulation
targeting the Output/Efficacy Stage of the production lifecycle.
It is also important to note that a primary impetus behind the
passing of California Senate Bill 1386, which later became what is
now California’s SBN, was the desire to improve the ability of
“[California] consumers [to] protect their financial security.”139
Specifically, the legislature sought to accomplish this by establishing

135. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2).
136. Id. § 899-aa.
137. New York State also has a centralized notification requirement (§ 899-aa(8)(a)) which requires
notification of three state agencies in the event of any breach affecting New York State residents and a
consumer reporting agency notification requirement (§ 899-aa(8)(b)) which requires notification of the
three major consumer reporting agencies in the event of a breach affecting more than 5,000 New York
State residents. Id. § 899-aa(8)(a)-(b).
138. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.81.5–1798.82 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36(a)-701
(2006). See also State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41 (providing a current listing of
and citations to all U.S. jurisdictions with SBNs).
139. CAL. ASSEMB., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1386, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (2002) (Senate Third
Reading and analysis of Saskia Kim).
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law requiring organizations to make consumers aware of when their
data was compromised.140 This impetus does not affect the present
analysis of the law’s character, as it simply defines the social goal
that the performance-based means were chosen to advance.141 The
impetus is, however, important to note, and it raises the question of
whether the law is actually effective at achieving this goal.
Interviews with CISOs revealed the surprising result that SBNs
had a predominant effect of driving the implementation of technical
practices.142 Specifically, organizations began to institute unilateral
laptop/portable media encryption policies.143 According to several
respondents, this effort was not a response to any particular evidence
that doing so would decrease the number of individuals whose
identity was stolen as a result of data breaches,144 but rather in
response to the spread of SBNs throughout U.S. jurisdictions and the
high-profile security incidents disclosed pursuant to those laws.
Consider, for example, the following excerpts from one interview
with the CISO of a large healthcare organization:
And so what’s been really interesting about the notification laws
is [they] have come in and they have essentially reversed the
whole direction security was taking . . . the security investment is
moved essentially to crypto. Just encrypt as much as you can.
Whatever it takes, just encrypt it. If it moves, encrypt it. If it
stays there, encrypt it.145

According to this respondent, SBNs have directly resulted in the
respondent’s organization implementing encryption policies for all of
their portable computing devices and media.146 These policies clearly
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See discussion infra Part IV; Thaw, supra note 55, at 22.
143. Thaw, supra note 55, at 22 n.66.
144. This is not to say that doing so would not have an effect in reducing identity theft, nor is it to say
that encrypting portable media is an ineffective security practice.
145. Thaw, supra note 55, at 37.
146. Id.
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result in the adoption of a specific technology (encryption), a classic
example of the means-based regulation parameter. The respondent
also specifically describes how existing data and devices will be
encrypted: “Just encrypt as much as you can. Whatever it takes, just
encrypt it.”147 This language implies that the “reversal” in
organizational direction resulted in post-facto changes to the existing
system, thus producing an effect at the Implementation/Maintenance
Stage. While one might imagine a policy change involving
encryption to affect the Design/Planning Stage,148 the language in
this instance makes clear that effect occurs at the
Implementation/Maintenance
Stage
in
this
respondent’s
organization.149 Finally, although perhaps obvious, it is worth noting
that the respondent’s language describes an effect resulting from the
introduction of SBNs, not the specific intent of the SBNs
themselves.150 The intended “targets” of SBNs were the reduction of
data breach incidents and ensuring that individuals were made aware
when their identity had been placed at risk of “theft” or other use in
fraudulent activity.151
Another respondent identified this same effect of SBNs driving
encryption, although interestingly did so in a more positive
context.152 The respondent described how it simplified their
organization’s process of complying with the law, and provided their
organization flexibility in selecting specific technologies to meet the
encryption “goal”:

147. Id.
148. For example, a policy that an organization’s security professionals must design a system capable
of scanning all future (and possibly existing) data for qualifying “sensitive information” and, when such
information is found, that information must automatically (via some technical mechanism) become
subject to encryption requirements. An approach of this form would more substantially affect the
Design/Planning stage than that policy discussed by this respondent.
149. In this sense, the encryption mandate was both a directive to do things a certain way in the future
(Design/Planning stage) and a directive to layer encryption onto existing systems
(Implementation/Maintenance stage).
150. Thaw, supra note 55, at 37–38.
151. Id. at 38.
152. Id.
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. . . despite my reservations about SB-1396, on which most of the
breach notification legislation has been modeled, it was
exemplary in one regard . . . it was an extremely small piece of
legislation . . . [that] has the whole encryption safe harbor
concept built into it which [], in practice, has turned out to be
very prescient. . . . [D]espite my issues with it, there is a
difference between [a] breach and a loss of custody, and [the
encryption safe harbor] is a very good example of how to
manage [compliance to avoid reporting].153

The respondent here clearly does not think that ordinary loss of
custody, such as a laptop being stolen in a public café, should give
rise to a reportable incident. Yet the respondent indicates,
nonetheless, that the encryption safe harbor has simplified their
responsibilities by providing a single method for “compliance” with
SBNs (avoidance of the reporting requirement)—encrypting all
portable computing devices and media.154 The respondent further
notes that they find this style of approach preferable “‘[b]ecause it
does not legislate technology,’” referring to the fact that their
organization is able to select which encryption technologies are used
to achieve the goal.155
While both respondents identify a condition supporting the
proposition that SBNs have an effect of driving the use of encryption
technology, it is interesting to note the divergent views they took as
to the appropriateness of that approach. These divergent views may
provide insight into the effects of this type of regulation on different
types of organizations. I explore this concept further in Part IV.156
Interestingly, in addition to being one form of regulation
considered by this work, SBNs are also the cause enabling the
quantitative analysis used to compare directive regulation and
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation. As discussed further in
153.
154.
155.
156.
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Part III, the notification requirement of SBNs gives rise to sufficient
security incident reporting to facilitate analysis of regulatory
impact.157 Based on the data available, it seems unlikely a sufficient
number of incidents would have been reported without these laws to
allow statistically-valid analysis.
B. Management-Based Regulatory Delegation
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is a mode of regulation
under which administrative agencies, through legislative-mandated
collaboration with regulatory stakeholders, promulgate regulations
requiring regulated entities to develop plans designed to achieve
certain aspirational goals laid out by the legislature. The regulatory
goal in this case is the development of the compliance plan itself (and
possible adherence to that plan), rather than the necessary
achievement of stated goals or usage of certain means to achieve
those goals, as is the case with directive regulation.
This category of regulation is a combination of two threads of
discussion in the current literature: 1) Coglianese and Lazer’s
management-based regulation;158 and 2) Bamberger’s regulatory
delegation.159 Management-based regulation relies on a concept of
administrative agencies promulgating requirements that regulated
entities develop (and possibly adhere to) compliance plans.160 The
application of this paradigm, once decoupled from issues of timing,
to information security regulation is relatively straightforward. It is,
however, incomplete for two reasons. First, Coglianese and Lazer’s
conception fails to capture the concept of legislatively-mandated
involvement of private parties (regulatory capture). Second,
157. See discussion infra Part III.
158. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24.
159. Bamberger, supra note 18, at 385; Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on
the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 265–70 (2011) [hereinafter Bamberger &
Mulligan, Privacy on the Books] (discussing the limited reach of privacy regulation in shaping privacy
practices); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 79-80 (2008) [hereinafter Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy
Decisionmaking], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104728.
160. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 692.
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management-based regulation alone fails to capture the degree to
which organizations may be subject to other incentives not directly
enshrined in but resulting from the structure of the regulation.
As Bamberger (and later Bamberger and Mulligan) discuss,161 in
certain contexts regulators lack the experience or resources necessary
to understand and/or keep pace with the myriad different challenges
facing regulated entities (particularly in heterogeneous
industries162)163 or to promulgate regulations lacking relevance to
guide business decision-makers (particularly in privacy matters).164
The result is a circumstance in which, to move forward effectively,
regulators must rely increasingly on input from regulated entities.
Management-based regulation provides a solid foundation for such
an approach but requires greater input from stakeholders than
envisioned by Coglianese and Lazer to ensure the promulgated
regulations setting forth compliance plan requirements are
sufficiently robust to avoid a compliance “race to the bottom.”165
This is particularly true in the context of information security, where
regulators rely heavily on a concept of “reasonableness”—a concept
traditionally understood in law, but lacking operational meaning in
the context of information security due to a lack of an appropriate
“reasonable person” standard166 and a lack of a well-agreed upon
licensed professional standard upon which to rely for expert
advice.167
161. See generally Bamberger, supra note 18; Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra
note 159; Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 159.
162. Heterogeneity among regulated entities is a particularly acute problem in the information
security regulatory context since cybersecurity regulation generally targets entities whose core
competency is not information security (or even information technology). The vast majority of
organizations custodian to sensitive information regulated by the laws discussed here are in the
healthcare or finance sectors, as well as other entities across all industrial sectors who handle substantial
volumes of consumer records. See discussion infra Part IV.
163. Bamberger, supra note 18, at 387.
164. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 159, at 266.
165. Coglianese and Lazer supra note 24, 700–02; Thaw, supra note 55, at 30–31.
166. The “reasonable” layperson likely lacks any meaningful understanding of information security
practices and certainly is incapable of evaluating those practices.
167. Many professional “certifications” exist, most notably the Certified Information Systems
Security Professional (CISSP) certification, administered by the International Information System
Security Certification Consortium ((ISC)2). However, to-date these certifications remain largely
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By extending the concept of management-based regulation to
include a concept of regulatory delegation to private entities
(particularly with substantial involvement of private parties in the
rulemaking process, as described above), the model proposed here
addresses the concomitant challenges of a rapidly evolving regulatory
climate, substantial heterogeneity among regulated entities, and a
need for sufficiently well-defined regulations so as to avoid a
regulatory “race to the bottom” in an environment relying heavily
upon but lacking a good definition of “reasonableness.”168
Thus, merging the concepts of management-based regulation and
regulatory delegation provides a category into which to group
information security laws and regulations for the purposes of
comparison. The sections that follow examine this combination of
principles in the context of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),169 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act (GLBA),170 and the regulatory
jurisprudence of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)171 through its
enforcement actions and consent decrees on information security
matters. The combination of these two themes in regulation allows
these three core areas of information security regulation to be
understood together. Understanding them together is important
because of the degree to which their evolution relied upon one
another and as a result the degree to which they share common
characteristics as a class of regulation.

vocational training certificates and do not equate to the standard of “learned professionals” the law often
turns to in complex areas such as science, medicine, and engineering where a “reasonable person”
standard cannot be adopted from the average layperson. See generally Certified Information Systems
Security Professional, (ISC)2, https://www.isc2.org/cissp/default.aspxhttps://www.isc2.org/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2014).
168. Curiously, this merger of the need for flexibility as to response with a lack of definition as to
compliant appears to parallel the traditional philosophical quandary of concurrently needing both
structure and flexibility. It may be worth exploring further to determine under what other circumstances
(i.e., what other regulatory contexts) this set of circumstances may arise and whether the blended
regulation solution proposed herein may be applicable.
169. See infra Part II.1.
170. See infra Part II.2.
171. See infra Part II.3.
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1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Security
and Privacy Rules (HIPAA)
HIPAA was passed in 1996 as part of a broad effort to reform
various aspects of the healthcare and health insurance systems in the
United States.172 As part of the legislation, Congress included
provisions with respect to the information security of certain
information describing the identity, medical conditions, and finances
of individuals.173 This information is collectively termed Protected
Health Information (PHI)174 and includes information created or
received by entities involved in the healthcare process relating to the
health condition or care of an individual.175
The provisions pertaining to information security apply to any
organization which is a Covered Entity or (under certain
circumstances) a Business Associate of a Covered Entity.176 Covered
Entities generally include health (insurance) plans, healthcare
information clearinghouses, and healthcare providers.177 Business
Associates generally include any organization that works with a
Covered Entity and handles PHI on behalf of or to provide services to
the Covered Entity.178 Although there has been some discussion as to
the applicability of various aspects of the term Business Associate,
these definitions generally mean that the HIPAA Security Rule
applies to all healthcare insurance organizations, processing
organizations that support healthcare insurance organizations,
medical providers (if they use electronic records), and any other

172. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006).
174. Originally the statute described this information as “Individually Identifiable Health
Information.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6). The implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services collectively termed information subject to HIPAA’s Privacy and Security
rules as “Protected Health Information.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6)(B).
176. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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entities that engage in business with them if that business transaction
involves the exchange or handling of PHI.179
The HIPAA Security Rule comprises two key elements: (1) a
statutory instruction by Congress for the Department of Health and
Human Services to promulgate regulations establishing information
security standards for the handling of PHI180 and (2) a general
instruction to organizations covered by the Rule that they maintain
appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.181 The
first element is the key provision under which specific information
security regulations part of HIPAA are promulgated. It generally
requires that the regulations take into account available technologies,
costs of security measures, training needs, the value of various
security measures, and the varying sizes of healthcare organizations
and providers.182
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services pursuant to this provision183 are too numerous to list
here in a comprehensive fashion, and doing so would not
substantially illuminate the discussion of characterizing HIPAA’s
Security Rule as a regulatory device. Rather, it is worth examining
the method by which the regulations are promulgated and the
substantive breadth of resultant regulations in the context of the
ISPL.
HIPAA is a hybrid form of management-based regulation. It
exhibits the classic characteristics of management-based regulation,
requiring firms to conduct risk assessments and develop plans to
address the identified risks.184 The HIPAA regulations also specify
certain protection measures that regulated organizations must
undertake, similar to means-based regulation.185 Unlike traditional
means-based regulation, however, the regulations do not specify the
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(1) (2006).
Id. § 1320d-2(d)(2).
Id. § 1320d-2(d).
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102–.534 (2013).
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2).
Id.
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implementation details for those measures. Rather, such regulations
explicitly leave those implementation details to the regulated
entities.186
HIPAA involves a notice-and-comment process with legislative
direction to give deference to key stakeholders.187 Specifically, it
requires the Department of Health and Human Services to consult
with the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, which
comprises key stakeholders from industry, government, and
academia.188
The regulations promulgated under the HIPAA Security Rule bear
many aspects of traditional management-based regulation under
Coglianese and Lazer’s typology. The general requirements189 and
flexibility of approach190 specified in the general rules for security
standards require organizations to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of electronic medical records, protect
against reasonably anticipated threats, and ensure workforce
compliance.191
This general requirement that organizations engage in
comprehensive activities to protect their information assets typifies
management-based regulation. The “flexibility of approach”
provision effectively delegates the responsibility for planning these
activities to the regulated entity, thereby exhibiting the classic form
of management-based regulation. This provision provides that
covered entities may use any security measures reasonably and
appropriately capable of achieving the specific security goals and
requires that the entity take into account its size, scope, complexity,
current technical infrastructure, costs, and levels of risk in making
such determinations as to reasonableness.192

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(5).
Id. § 1320d-2(a)(5)(B).
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2013).
Id. § 164.306(b).
Id. § 164.306(a)–(b).
Id. § 164.306(b).
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Furthermore, in addition to this flexibility of approach, the
regulations specifically require regulated entities to “[c]onduct an
accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and
vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
electronic protected health information held by the covered
entity . . . .”193 and to “[i]mplement security measures sufficient to
reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level
to comply with § 164.306(a).”194 These directives to conduct risk
assessments and implement security measures consistent with those
risk assessments are perfect examples of traditional managementbased regulation.
The HIPAA Security Rule is far more expansive, however, than
the assessment and planning requirements outlined above. Unlike
traditional management-based regulation, it goes on to detail highlyspecific elements the plan must contain—almost taking it to the
degree of means-based regulation, but stopping short by leaving the
details of implementation to the discretion of the regulated entity
consistent with the flexibility of approach provisions outlined
above.195 Consider the following four provisions of the HIPAA
Security Rule regulations:
(i) Unique user identification (Required). Assign a unique name
and/or number for identifying and tracking user identity.
(ii) Emergency access procedure (Required). Establish (and
implement as needed) procedures for obtaining necessary
electronic protected health information during an emergency.
(iii) Automatic logoff (Addressable). Implement electronic
procedures that terminate an electronic session after a
predetermined time of inactivity.
(iv) Encryption and decryption (Addressable). Implement a
mechanism to encrypt and decrypt electronic protected health

193. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2013).
194. Id. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B).
195. Id. § 164.306(b).
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information.196

The four provisions are the “implementation specifications” for the
“standard” specified in 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2) governing access
control, which states that regulated organizations must “[i]mplement
technical policies and procedures for electronic information systems
that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access
only to those persons or software programs that have been granted
access rights as specified in § 164.308(a)(4).”197 The standard clearly
resembles management-based regulation, but the implementation
specifications diverge from traditional management-based regulation
by clearly targeting the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the
ISPL.198 This bifurcated approach is replicated in nearly all sections
of the regulations implementing the HIPAA Security Rule, thus
suggesting that HIPAA is also management-based regulation that
targets the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the ISPL.199 As
discussed in Part IV, this bifurcation has implications for the
relationship between senior managers and information security
professionals at regulated organizations.200
2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act (GLBA)
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999201
specifies requirements for the Financial Institutions Safeguards Rule
(Safeguards).202 The Safeguards require that certain federal financial
regulators promulgate regulations establishing standards for

196. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2) (2013).
197. Id. § 164.312(a)(1).
198. Thaw, supra note 55, at 43.
199. Id.
200. See discussion infra Part IV.
201. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29
U.S.C.).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012).
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administrative, technical, and physical safeguards against information
security threats to consumer financial data.203
The Safeguards require each of the agencies204 charged with
enforcing the provisions of GLBA to promulgate regulations
implementing the Rule.205 The FTC has promulgated a series of
regulations pursuant to the Safeguards, which they call the
“Safeguards Rule.”206 The OCC, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and
the OTS jointly issued regulations, which they call the “Interagency
Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to
Customer Information and Consumer Notice” (“Interagency
Guidelines”).207 I examine each of these two sets of regulations to
illustrate that GLBA, like HIPAA, is also a form of bifurcated
management-based regulation targeting both the Design/Planning
Stage of the ISPL and the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the
ISPL. Collectively these cover all organizations included in the CISO
interviews.208 Based on those interviews, the author’s experience in
private practice, and discussions with practitioners, these rules

203. Id.
204. At the time of its enactment, GLBA charged seven federal regulatory agencies with enforcing the
privacy and security provisions of the Act, specifically including promulgating regulations to implement
these provisions of GLBA. These agencies included: (1) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC); (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systems (Federal Reserve); (3) the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS); (5) the Board of the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); (6) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);
and (7) the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 15 U.S.C. §§ 6805(a), 6809(2) (2012). Section 6805(a)(6)
technically permits state insurance regulators to engage in enforcement of the GLBA Safeguards Rule,
however considering the actions of state regulators in this regard is outside the scope of analysis for this
paper. It is unclear why the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which has other
regulatory roles under GLBA, was not explicitly listed in Section 6805(a). This is particularly
interesting considering the CFTC recently promulgated regulations pursuant to the GLBA Privacy rule.
Joshua Lynch, CFTC Proposes Rules on Affiliate Marketing, Data Disposal, and GLBA Privacy,
CHRON. DATA PROTECTION, http://www.hldataprotection.com/2010/10/articles/financial-privacy/cftcproposes-rules-on-affiliate-marketing-data-disposal-and-glba-privacy/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
206. 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2013).
207. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information
and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15736-01 (Mar. 29, 2005) (codified at scattered sections of 12
C.F.R. pt. 30).
208. See discussion infra Part IV.
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comprise the bulk of financial regulatory rules driving information
security compliance.209
GLBA has some aspects that suggest Congress intended to involve
industry in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
Additionally, as discussed in Part IV, the CISO interviews revealed
that financial institutions had substantial incentive to participate in
this process.210 While not as stark an example as HIPAA, it appears
that Congress’s intent with respect to GLBA was more oriented
toward a regulatory delegation model than toward the traditional
notice-and-comment process.211
a. The FTC GLBA “Safeguards Rule”
The FTC regulations are particularly notable because, as discussed
in Part II, the Safeguards Rule guided certain key elements of the
FTC’s jurisprudence in their privacy and data security enforcement
actions.212 The implementing regulations promulgated by the FTC
specify that regulated entities must develop, implement, and maintain
comprehensive written information security programs addressing
administrative, technical, and physical risks to the security and
confidentiality of customer information.213
These regulations are a classic example of management-based
regulation. They require individual-regulated organizations to
develop plans appropriate to each organization’s size, scope, and
complexity to achieve a set of specified objectives related to
information security. The objectives are described in broad
categories, directing the organization but leaving wide discretion to
innovate in selecting approaches for compliance. This is precisely
209. Not discussed in this work are the information security guidelines promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service. These guidelines generally apply to few entities and, as yet, there is no evidence they
drive compliance effects on a significant scale.
210. See discussion infra Part IV.
211. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 5136A(a)(5), 113
Stat. 1338, 1374 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C.,
18 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
212. 16 C.F.R. § 314.2(c) (2013).
213. Id.
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consistent with the concept of management-based regulation
discussed above.
The FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule goes on to provide some
limited additional specification as to what each information security
program shall contain, requiring that “[i]n order to develop,
implement, and maintain [an] information security program,
[regulated organizations] shall” engage in a specified series of
activities to design and maintain that plan.214 These generally include
designation of specific employee(s) with responsibility for the plan,
identification of reasonably foreseeable security risks, development
of controls and procedures to mitigate those risks, oversight of
service providers to ensure their activities are consistent with the
plan, and periodic evaluation and revision of the information security
plan.215
These specifications are not so overly detailed with respect to
implementation so as to suggest a means-based character of
regulation, nor do they sufficiently interfere in that regard so as to
suggest targeting of the Implementation/Maintenance Stage. The
FTC’s guidelines, however, do have an interesting requirement of
regulated organizations to “regularly test or otherwise monitor the
effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems and
procedures”216 and “[e]valuat[ing] and adjust[ing] [the] information
security program in light of the results of [that testing].”217 This
regular testing and evaluation requirement speaks directly to
outcomes and, in this regard, targets the Output/Efficacy Stage of the
ISPL. This is reinforced by the evaluation and adjustment
requirement which, while effectively requiring the organization to
repeat the risk assessment process at regular intervals, ties the
conduct of those repeated assessments to the outcomes sufficiently to

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. § 314.4.
Id.
Id. § 314.4(c).
Id. § 314.4(e).
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suggest that the Output/Efficacy Stage is substantially targeted by
this regulation.218
b. The GLBA Interagency Guidelines on Information
Security
The GLBA Interagency Guidelines on Information Security differ
from the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule in that they are a form of
bifurcated management-based regulation that targets both the
Design/Planning and Implementation/Maintenance Stages of the
ISPL. The bifurcation present in the Interagency Guidelines is
structurally very similar to that present in HIPAA.
The Interagency Guidelines begin with a general directive
specifying that each organization shall design and implement a
written information security plan, addressing administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards and considering the nature and
scope of the regulated entity, designed to ensure the security and
confidentiality of customer information and protecting against threats
to that information.219 Interestingly, unlike some other general
directives, this one also includes a specific reference to data disposal
requirements.220
Just as with the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule above, these
regulations represent a classic example of management-based
regulation. They require individual regulated organizations to
develop plans appropriate to each organization’s size, scope, and
complexity to achieve a set of specified objectives related to
information security.221 The objectives are described in broad
categories, directing the organization but leaving it wide discretion to
innovate in selecting approaches for compliance.222
Like the HIPAA regulations discussed above, the Interagency
Guidelines also specify in detail what elements an information
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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12 C.F.R. § 30, App. B § (II) (2013).
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security program must contain and what goals those elements much
achieve.223 Generally, they include requirements for access controls,
encryption, administrative procedures, segregation of duties,
employee background checks, system monitoring (specifically
including intrusion detection), incident response, training, and regular
testing of systems.224
The Interagency Guidelines lack the details as to implementation,
however, that would qualify a means-based classification of their
regulatory style. Nonetheless, the degree of detail as to areas that
must
be
covered
substantially
interferes
at
the
Implementation/Maintenance Stage so as to conclude that these
regulations are a form of management-based regulation that targets
the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the ISPL. Interestingly,
unlike the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rules, the Interagency
Guidelines lack the ongoing re-evaluation requirement that targets
the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL.225
3. FTC Enforcement Action/Jurisprudence
Beginning in the early 2000s, the Federal Trade Commission
conducted investigations into and brought enforcement actions
against organizations that exhibited poor information security
practices in the handling of personal information, sensitive
information, or both.226 Their primary statutory basis227 for doing so
223. Id. § (III)(A–B).
224. Id. § (III)(C).
225. Compare 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(e) (2013) (GLBA Safeguards), with 12 C.F.R. § 30, App. B
(Interagency Guidelines).
226. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 144
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Christopher Wolf, Enforcement and Policy at the FTC and the
Impact on Businesses, BrightTALK (Apr. 8, 2010), https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/288/20491.
227. There are a number of other secondary statutory bases upon which the FTC rests its data security
enforcement actions, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81u), the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x), the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (codified in
scattered parts of 42 U.S.C.)), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act (discussed above
in Part II.2), and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–05). For the purposes
of this section, with the exception of GLBA, these secondary bases are unimportant as to the
classification of the FTC’s jurisprudence according to my revised typology of information security
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was Section 5 of the FTC Act, which grants the Commission the
authority to investigate and challenge business practices it finds
unfair or deceptive.228 Pursuant to this authority, the FTC brought
several enforcement actions229 against organizations it believed to
have engaged in “unfair or deceptive” information security practices
that violate Section 5.230 Generally speaking, the Commission
asserted as “deceptive” those practices where organizations promised
one level of security and failed to deliver that level of security,231 and
asserted as “unfair” those practices where organizations failed to
provide a reasonable and appropriate level of security in protecting
sensitive and/or personal information.232
In practice, nearly all these matters result in a settlement between
the organization under investigation and the Commission.233 These
settlements generally include the following elements: (1) an
agreement to discontinue, correct the offending information security
practices; or both,234 and (2) an agreement to engage in ongoing
periodic information security assessments the results of which must
be attested to by a certified professional.235 In rare circumstances
where the violation alleged is so severe and the resultant consumer

regulation.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
229. In a few notable cases where the Commission deemed it appropriate, in conjunction with the
Department of Justice, the FTC brought actions in federal district court rather than as an enforcement
action. The effective result was the same, with those matters reaching settlement under the jurisdiction
of the court rather than a consent decree under the jurisdiction of the Commission. See, e.g., Complaint
for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, United States v. Choicepoint, Inc.,
No. 06-CV-0198 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006), 2006 WL 236338; Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for
Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, United States v. Choicepoint, Inc.,
No. 06-CV-0198 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2006/01/stipfinaljudgement.pdf (regarding the form of settlement).
230. See, e.g., In re Twitter, Inc., No. C-4316, 2011 WL 914034 (F.T.C. Mar. 2, 2011); In re
Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709 (2002).
231. Twitter, Inc., 2011 WL 914034, at *4; Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709, 748-50.
232. In re TJX Cos., No. C-4227, 2008 WL 3150421, at *2 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008); In re BJ’s
Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 WL 2395788, at *2 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005).
233. See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 WL 2395788, at *2.
234. See, e.g., In re DSW Inc., File No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974, at *4 (F.T.C. Dec. 1, 2005)
(requiring DSW to implement a “comprehensive information security program”).
235. See, e.g., DSW Inc., 2005 WL 3366974, at *4–5 (explaining that certain certified (as opposed to
licensed) professional(s) are eligible to certify these assessments).
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harm alleged so grievous, the Commission may also require
compensatory or punitive damages.236 These consent decrees and
settlements form the basis for the aspects of FTC data security
enforcement used herein to classify the regulatory style of the
Commission’s jurisprudence. Generally, the FTC’s style of
regulation is a mix between management-based regulation and
means-based regulation targeting all stages of the ISPL.
The initial and ongoing risk assessment requirement of the FTC’s
GLBA Safeguards Rule is best described as a bifurcated style of
management-based regulation that targets both the Design/Planning
and the Efficacy/Output Stages of the ISPL. This is perhaps
unsurprising, given that the Commission identified in a 2005
prepared statement to Congress that it based its risk assessment
requirements in its enforcement action consent decrees upon those
requirements in the Safeguards Rule:
To date, the Commission has brought five cases against
companies for deceptive security claims, alleging that the
companies made explicit or implicit promises to take reasonable
steps to protect sensitive consumer information. Because they
allegedly failed to take such steps, their claims were deceptive.
The consent orders settling these cases have required the
companies to implement rigorous information security programs
generally conforming to the standards set forth in the GLBA
Safeguards Rule.237

Like the risk assessment requirements in HIPAA and GLBA, the
risk assessment requirements under the FTC’s enforcement action
settlements require organizations to engage in an initial risk
assessment within a specified period of time, develop an information
236. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1994) (stating that such matters often end up in federal district court).
237. Enhancing Data Security: The Regulators’ Perspective: Hearing Before theSubcomm. on Fin.
Inst. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (prepared statement of
the Federal Trade Commission delivered by Lydia Parnes, Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection of the Federal Trade Commission) (citations omitted).
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security plan consistent with that risk assessment, conduct periodic
assessments thereafter, and update their information security plans
accordingly.238
The provisions pertaining to the conduct of an initial risk
assessment and development of an initial information security
program are classic examples of a management-based style of
regulation, with the slight exception that they are the result of an
enforcement action by an administrative agency and apply to a
specific organization rather than the result of rules promulgated by an
administrative agency and applicable to all regulated entities
thereunder. However, this difference does not change the functional
character of the regulation. The provisions detailing what substantive
areas the assessment and plan must cover are sufficiently broad so as
neither to implicate a functional character of means-based regulation
nor to interfere substantially at the Implementation/Maintenance
Stage of the ISPL. The intent of the regulation clearly is targeted
because the requirements are the result of an enforcement action
against a specific organization. Thus the classification of the
regulation in this regard is management-based regulation targeting
the Design/Planning Stage of the ISPL.
The FTC’s settlements also include requirements for ongoing risk
assessments and updating of the information security program as
appropriate based on the results of those ongoing assessments.239
This regular assessment requirement speaks directly to information
security outcomes and, therefore, targets the Output/Efficacy Stage of
the ISPL. This intent characterization is reinforced by the updating
requirement, which sufficiently ties the conduct of the periodic
assessments to the outcomes to suggest that the Output/Efficacy
Stage is substantially targeted by this regulation. Thus, the
classification of the regulation in this regard is management-based
regulation targeting the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL.
Therefore, similar to the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule, the FTC’s
238. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 WL 2395788, at *2.
239. Id.
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enforcement actions—as they pertain to the subjects of the
enforcement—are management-based regulation targeting each of the
Design/Planning Stage and the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of
the ISPL.
a. Indirect Consequences of FTC Enforcement Actions240
The FTC enforcement actions and settlements contain provisions
identifying the offending practices as “unfair” or “deceptive” and
require the subject of the enforcement action to discontinue the
offending practices.241 This is a classic form of means-based
regulation, whereby the subject of the enforcement action is required
to discontinue use of a specific practice, procedure, or technology.
Consider the case involving Reed Elsevier, Inc. and Seisint, Inc.242
In this enforcement action, the FTC alleged that Reed Elsevier and
Seisint (which was subsequently acquired by Reed Elsevier) failed to
utilize sufficient authentication procedures with respect to verifying
the identity and authorization of users of its consumer information
services.243 The FTC alleged that verified incidents of identity theft
resulted from these failures.244
In this part of the complaint, the Commission effectively created a
list of specific requirements that any comprehensive information
security program satisfying the requirements of the consent decree
would be required to implement.245 By effectively requiring the
240. This section provides a (perhaps digressive) discussion of aspects of FTC enforcement that are
not exactly Management-Based Regulatory Delegation. These aspects, or rather the effects of these
aspects, are intertwined with the primary management-based aspects of the regulation. They are notable
as matters of discussion in the context of this work because, as noted at the end of this section, they are
consistent with and foreshadow recommendations that flow from the quantitative analysis presented. See
discussion infra Part III.
241. See, e.g., In re Reed Elsevier, Inc. & Seisint, Inc., File No. C-4226, 2008 WL 3150420 (F.T.C.
July 29, 2008).
242. Id.
243. Id. at *1–2.
244. Id. at *3.
245. Id. at *7 (“Each Assessment shall: A. set forth the specific administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards that respondent has implemented and maintained during the reporting period; B. explain how
such safeguards are appropriate to respondent’s size and complexity, the nature and scope of
respondent’s activities, and the sensitivity of the personal information collected from or about
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respondent organization to address these specific technical measures,
the FTC engaged in a form of means-based regulation. The
regulation obviously targeted the specific respondent. While some of
the items identified above would require design and planning
changes to resolve, the post-facto nature of this regulation—by the
function of it being an enforcement action, not a proactive set of
promulgated regulations—suggests it is more appropriately
characterized as targeting the Implementation/Maintenance Stage as
it will affect systems already in use by the respondent. Thus, this
aspect of FTC enforcement is best classified as means-based
regulation targeting the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the
ISPL.
The identification of alleged unfair or deceptive information
security practices by the FTC in its various complaints has created a
curious effect in how those involved in information security practice
perceive the regulatory requirements to which they are subject. In
short, the specific practices identified by the Commission in its
complaints have resulted in rules that organizations must follow—
specifically, organizations must not engage in those practices
identified in the complaints as unfair or deceptive.
This is a curious effect, because notwithstanding the analysis
above, no formal statute or regulation actually requires organizations
(other than the subjects of the enforcement actions) to avoid such
practices. There is only the threat of future enforcement by the FTC
that drives such “compliance.” From the practitioner’s perspective,
this may be an overly fine distinction. If a client asks whether an
activity is permissible under federal law, and the Commission has
identified it as potentially violative of Section 5 of the FTC Act, the
practical answer to the client is almost assuredly to avoid the
allegedly offending practice. Consider, for example, the reply of one
CISO of a large information technology company who described the
consumers; C. explain how the safeguards that have been implemented meet or exceed the protections
required by Paragraph I of this order; and D. certify that respondent’s security program is operating with
sufficient effectiveness to provide reasonable assurance that the security, confidentiality, and integrity of
personal information is protected and has so operated throughout the reporting period.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2013

55

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1

342

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

TJX enforcement action as providing some definable guidance as to
what not to do:
. . . so there are some don’t do mechanisms that we apply by
process that are also helped by regulation because if we didn’t
have that [regulation] to test to we might not think about it today.
We couldn’t get to it [that information security practice]. It
wouldn’t be like, ‘Oh, gosh, the TJ Maxx incident is pretty
good.’”246

This respondent identifies the TJ Maxx incident as supporting their
efforts to advance certain (desirable) information security practices
and suggests that absent the FTC’s enforcement action in response to
the incident, they might not be able to defend those practices within
their organization.247
Collectively, the discussion above identifies ways in which FTC
enforcement actions result in de facto regulations affecting each stage
of the ISPL. While the empirical evidence in this regard is
preliminary, it is consistent with the conclusions from the
quantitative comparisons presented in Part III.248
III. QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS: TRACKING SECURITY BREACH
INCIDENCE
In many areas of regulation, such as pollution control and food
safety, quantitative measures provide critical insight into regulatory
efficacy. Information security poses a somewhat more difficult
challenge in this regard, because it—by definition—lacks a control
population against which to test effectiveness of security measures.249
246. Thaw, supra note 55, at 54.
247. Id.
248. See discussion infra Part III.
249. This is because it is impossible to gather data either: (1) on the total number of attacks underway,
since not all attacks can be identified at the time of engagement (e.g., zero-day vulnerabilities); or (2) on
the number of attacks a fully-protected machine would withstand. The former is impossible both
because of the lack of a global structure for comprehensive surveillance and because so-called “zero-
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Those attempting to evaluate security effectiveness are faced with the
difficult challenge of “proving a negative”—showing that the reason
no catastrophic events occurred was the result of onerous security
measures. These measurement difficulties, in turn, make
quantitatively evaluating the efficacy of regulatory measures based
on successes difficult.
This work utilizes an alternate approach, measuring security
failures. Rather than looking at reductions in contaminants released
or bacterial infestations, it examines security breach incidence. This
approach, perhaps akin to measuring incidence of bacterial
infestation in infected foodstuffs, attempts to illuminate regulatory
efficacy by investigating the degree to which organizations take steps
to improve their security measures after the introduction of
regulation as measured by reductions in reported incidents.
A. Tracking Breaches of Personal Information (2000–2010)
Historically there has always been some nominal reporting of
security breach incidents. For the purposes of this analysis, a
“security breach” constitutes an event involving unauthorized access
to sensitive information, primarily as defined by the applicable state
SBNs but broadly construed so as to include other incidents that may
involve sensitive data but that fail to meet the strict triggering
day” attacks, by definition, cannot be detected at the time they are underway (because of the
vulnerability they exploit and, therefore, the signature of the attack is known only to the attacker).
Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 63, 64
n.7 (2010) (“A zero-day attack is a previously unseen attack on a previously unknown vulnerability. The
term refers to the fact that the vulnerability has been known to the defender for zero days. The adversary
has usually known of the attack for a much longer time.”). The latter is impossible because a “fullyprotected” machine only exists in a vacuum—one completely disconnected from any network and
locked in an impenetrable facility. The widely-varying business requirements of operational production
environments in organizations require that some risk exposure occur; otherwise, it would be impossible
for information systems to provide any services. Thus a “control group” against which to test live,
production systems cannot effectively be constructed on a global scale. Note, however, that with
sufficient public funding, it may be possible to construct an environment that mimics production
environments sufficiently to capture data and use for later analysis. While not a control group for the
purposes of comparison, such an environment would provide substantial useful information for the
purposes of analysis. Currently, however, no such (unclassified) proposals have received sufficient
funding to expect this as a usable data source in the near future.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

57

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1

344

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

guidelines to contain consumer information. The primary data source
is a database of such incidents maintained by the Open Security
Foundation.250 The period of analysis presented here is from January
1, 2000 through December 31, 2010.251
Traditional definitions of public versus private sector entities—
definitions that rely upon the for-profit status of an organization—do
not accurately reflect the demarcations recognized by the various
data security laws. Furthermore, following such a strict rule would
make examination of the healthcare sector difficult, as organizational
boundaries with respect to data ownership are not as clear as
organizational boundaries with respect to for-profit status.252
Accordingly, the final scope of inquiry extends beyond traditional
private firms to include organizations like hospitals and universities.
This treatment mirrors that of some state security breach notification
statutes, which apply separate requirements to governmental and
non-governmental entities, but do not distinguish between for-profit
and non-profit organizations.253 Those states that do not have
separate statutes for government organizations also make no
distinction between for-profit and non-profit organizations.254 Post250. Open Security Foundation DATALOSSDB, www.datalossdb.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). A
collection of the incidents reported by the Open Security Foundation is on file with the author.
251. As of late calendar year 2011, the data used in this analysis is no longer being made publicly
available by the Open Security Foundation. Repeated inquiries to the curators of the data regarding
accessing it for research purposes have gone unanswered. Currently, this dataset is the only
(unclassified) one of its kind available in the world.
252. Consider, for example, a research hospital. The hospital itself and any affiliated medical college
will be non-profit entities. The physicians within the hospital, however, are likely classified as
independent contractors. When practicing medicine at their “private offices,” they operate as
Professional Corporations, (Limited Liability) Partnerships, and other for-profit organizations under
state law. While these two “organizations” are distinct for fiscal purposes, they almost always share
patient records. Furthermore, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH Act) effectively requires such information sharing in order to meet certain guidelines for
federal funding. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
253. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/12 (2012) (creating separate statutory notification
requirements for state agencies experiencing data breaches and requiring additional reporting, including
in some cases to consumer reporting agencies); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 3(c) (2007) (mandating
additional centralized reporting requirements for entities experiencing a security breach if they are state
executive branch agencies).
254. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2008) (defining “business” as “a sole proprietorship,
partnership, corporation, association, or other group, however organized, and whether or not organized
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secondary educational institutions, therefore, unlike government
institutions, are mostly subject to the same requirements under state
breach notification laws as are private firms.255 Primary and
secondary educational institutions, however, are traditionally so
interwoven with state and local governments that considering them
separately would be difficult.256 Also included are “general” nonprofit organizations such as charitable foundations and research
institutions. As with private universities and hospitals, non-profits are
treated the same under state security breach notification statutes as
are private for-profit entities.257
1. Dataset and Variables
The primary dataset comprises a collection of publicly-known
security breach incidents maintained by the Open Security
Foundation (OSF) known as the DataLossDB database.258 As
described by the OSF:
DataLossDB is a research project aimed at documenting known
and reported data loss incidents world-wide. The effort is now a
community one, and with the move to Open Security
Foundation’s DataLossDB.org, asks for contributions of new
incidents and new data for existing incidents.259

Until early 2011, the database was an open-source effort, similar to
Wikipedia, that relied upon the contributions of individuals
worldwide to submit known incidents for review.260 Only limited
to operate at a profit.”) (emphasis added).
255. In some states (e.g., Illinois) state land-grant universities likely fall under the scope of
governmental entities. In others (e.g., Massachusetts) they probably do not.
256. Judith A. Winston, Achieving Excellence and Equal Opportunity in Education: No Conflict of
Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 997, 1003 (2001) (recognizing that state and local governments are jointly
responsible for primary and secondary education).
257. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1.
258. About OSF Data Loss, DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
259. Id.
260. About DataLossDB, DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org/about (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
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information regarding the methods of collecting data is available, and
suggests that the curators rely primarily on news media and public
information requests.261 Although somewhat detailed, these
descriptions lack specificity as to the statistical significance of their
sampling methods.
This lack of specification as to how incidents are captured does
present a methodological problem. As of the time of analysis,
however, no better resources were available, and this dataset serves
the purpose of allowing analysis on a dataset that at least is likely to
exhibit normally distributed error,262 to the extent error in reporting
exists. Notable limitations include the incentive for organizations not
to disclose incidents that represent breaches of security but escape the
technical reporting requirements (e.g., does not involve a covered
combination of personal information but otherwise involve sensitive
information) and the fact that there is no baseline for comparison
(i.e., there is no database indicating what incidents have not been
reported). Considering these limitations, as discussed below, the
focus on measuring only relative changes over time is appropriate.
2. Analysis Groups: Previously Regulated and Previously
Unregulated Entities
Categorizing existing information security law and regulation into
two groups allows the empirical comparison of the efficacy of those
styles of regulation. The first group, directive regulation, comprises
the state Security Breach Notification laws (SBNs), and the second
group, Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, comprises
HIPAA, GLBA, and the FTC’s Section 5 privacy and information
security enforcement activity. The chronological order in which these
statutes were enacted allows quantitative comparison of their efficacy
261. See id.
262. Each of the SBNs are laws of general applicability and, thus there is no reason to believe any
industry will have a reporting bias as a function of lack of access to reported incidents. For the purpose
of this analysis, I assume that all actors are rational with respect to reporting incidents as required under
the law once the organizations become aware of their reporting obligations, a condition not necessarily
coincident with when those organizations actually became subject to those obligations.
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by grouping organizations into two classes based on the type(s) of
regulation to which they were subject at various points. HIPAA was
enacted in 1996,263 and the Final Security Rule took effect in 2003.264
GLBA was enacted in 1999,265 the Interagency Guidelines became
effective in 2001,266 and the Safeguards Rule became effective in
2003.267 The state SBNs varied in their effective dates, beginning in
2003 with many being enacted toward the end of the decade.268 The
FTC’s privacy and data security enforcement, as discussed in Part
II,269 began in 2000 but did not substantially gain traction or attention
among regulated entities until much later in the decade, as discussed
in Part IV.270
SBNs are the primary drivers of security incident reporting in the
United States and were introduced in large scale several years after
the effective dates of HIPAA and GLBA.271 This chronology
suggests grouping organizations according to whether they were
previously subject to regulation at the time SBNs began to drive
reporting. The first group, Previously Regulated Entities (PREs),
comprises organizations primarily in the healthcare or finance sectors
that were subject to HIPAA or GLBA prior to the introduction of
SBNs. The second group, Previously Unregulated Entities (PUEs),
comprises organizations in most other sectors which previously were
not subject to information security regulation.272 Because the FTC’s
263. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
264. 16 C.F.R. § 314.5(a) (2013).
265. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29
U.S.C.).
266. 12 C.F.R. § 30, App. B § (III)(G) (2013).
267. 16 C.F.R. § 314.5(a) (2013).
268. State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41.
269. See discussion supra Part II.
270. See discussion infra Part IV.
271. State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41.
272. While some limited corner cases existed, including Department of Defense regulations, IRS
regulations, and those few organizations that drew the attention of the FTC in the early 2000s, these
instances are so small as not to bias the analysis. Furthermore, at that point in time—particularly with
large organizations at a time when security was not taken seriously as a business need—it would be
difficult to assume that such limited-scope regulations would be likely to drive costly, organization-wide
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enforcement jurisprudence did not appear to gain attention among
regulated entities until late in the 2000s, it is excluded as a category
for the purpose of quantitative analysis.273
As of February 17, 2011, the DataLossDB dataset contained 3,076
breach reports from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2010.274
2,575 were experienced by organizations in the United States.275 Of
these, 2,107 fit the criteria described above.276 810277 were from
previously-regulated industries and the remaining 1297 were from
previously-unregulated industries.278
3. (Three) Trends in Breach Incidence
Analysis of breach incidence from January 1, 2000 (t0) through
December 31, 2010 (tF) revealed three trends in periodic breach
incidence. The first trend is an initially low (and not statistically
significant) rate of reporting. This trend continues until
approximately Summer 2004 (t1), and describes a period prior to the
introduction of SBNs when organizations lacked incentives to report
and therefore only minimal reporting (or other discovery) of security
events occurred.
The second trend comprises a substantial rise in reporting rates,
lasting until approximately Summer 2008 (t2), and describes a period
during which SBNs started to become effective in various states and
organizations began reporting. During this period, reporting is
assumed to be incomplete either because organizations experiencing
incidents were not yet subject to SBNs or because they were unaware
of the reporting requirements of SBNs. No useful data is currently
available on the knowing disregard of reporting requirements, so this
practices. The interviews with CISOs, discussed in detail in Part IV, support this hypothesis.
273. If the Open Security Foundation data becomes available again, or another data source is
developed, analysis of more recent years’ activity may be informative as to the effects of FTC
enforcement as it gained awareness among organizations subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction.
274. See supra note 250.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 354 are from financial sector organizations, and 456 are from healthcare sector organizations. Id.
278. Id.
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variable is assumed to be uniformly distributed and excluded from
analysis. The mere presence of substantial regulation (and the
legislative history behind the regulation, as discussed in Part II)
suggests discounting the possibility that no incidents occurred prior
to t1 as an explanation for this trend.
The third trend comprises the period from t2 through the end of the
analysis period (tF), and describes a period during which the
incidence of reported breaches decreased. This period begins at the
point (t2) at which organizations are believed to be aware of their
reporting obligations under SBNs and all organizations required to
report are doing so.
Unlike most laws passed on a state-by-state basis, the triggering of
a notification statute is based neither on the residence of the
organization experiencing the breach nor on the location where the
event took place. Rather, the triggering of a notification statute is
based on the residence of individuals described in the lost data.279
This information is a function of the composition of the dataset
breached, and while the size (number of individuals whose
information was compromised) is released under many SBNs, the
composition of those individuals (i.e., their state of residence) is
not.280 Thus, information about which states’ laws would be triggered
is completely endogenous to each incident listed in the database.281
Therefore unlike with traditional state-by-state analysis where one
looks to the domicile of a firm to determine if it is affected by
279. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(a) (West 2006) (requiring notification “to any customer
who is a resident of New Jersey whose personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have
been, accessed by an unauthorized person”); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303(a) (2006) (requiring
notification to any resident of Pennsylvania).
280. Nor can the residence be inferred, because information about the residence of the individuals is
neither broken out comprehensively by state under any individual state statute’s central reporting
requirement nor do all states have centralized reporting requirements. Currently only 14 of 46 states
with SBNs require centralized reporting (notably, New York’s statute does mandate centralized
reporting). See State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41.
281. More specifically, such information is endogenous to the incident itself (as opposed to the record
in the database) and is reported neither in the record in the database nor in the primary sources often
cited in each record. While there are a (sparse) few incidents for which such information is reported,
these represent only a fraction of overall incidents and are therefore not useful for addressing this
problem.
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regulation it is impossible for the outside observer to make such a
determination.
The inflection points t1 and t2, which demarcate the trends in
breach incidence, are derived from polynomial regression analysis.
Polynomial regression analysis allows a curve (as opposed to a
straight line) of “best fit” to be determined for a set of data over an
extended period of time. Comprehensive analysis of polynomials of
orders 2 through 10 revealed that order 5 polynomials provided the
statistically best fit for describing trends in breach incidence for
organizations in both the PRE and PUE groups.282 The following
figures depict the results of those regressions:

Figure 1—Polynomial Regression Curve of Order 5 for PRE Breach
Incidence

282. A complete and comprehensive description of this analysis, the procedures used, and the results
are discussed in another work. See Thaw, supra note 55, at apps. A–A.6.
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Figure 2—Polynomial Regression Curve of Order 5 for PUE Breach
Incidence
While the points t1 and t2 vary slightly for PREs and PUEs, this
variance is within an acceptable margin of error both for the
regressions used and considering periodicity. This discrepancy
therefore does not suggest treating the two categories separately for
the purposes of analyzing the impact of regulation on security
outcomes.
B. Blended Regulation is Optimal at Preventing Breaches
Based on the trend periods established through the above methods,
I conducted analysis comparing PREs and PUEs during these
periods. The results suggest that a blend combining both directive
regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is optimal
for incentivizing organizations to employ security measures to
prevent security breaches involving sensitive personal information.
This analysis examines the period after SBN compliance reached
saturation (t2). At this point, all firms reporting incidents are assumed
to be aware they are subject to SBNs and reporting all applicable
incidents in good faith. Firms are assumed to have strong incentives
to reduce the number of reportable incidents they face. In addition to
the negative public relations potential, some studies have reported
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negative effects on stock price and firm performance following
incident reports (although the data is admittedly mixed)283 and the
interviews discussed in Part IV further suggest organizational
incentives to avoid reporting.284
Thus, if t2 represents the point at which no further increase in
reporting will occur due to other organizations learning of their
reporting obligations, it follows that from t2 through tF (and beyond)
there should be a decreasing trend in breach incidence. This trend
will primarily result from organizations taking security measures to
reduce the number of reportable incidents they experience.
Comparing the trends during this period between PREs and PUEs
provides insight into the efficacy of directive regulation and
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation at preventing breaches of
personal information.
With an established compliance saturation date for SBN reporting
(t2), linear regression from this point can provide more detailed
insight comparing these trends. The following figure and table depict
the results of these regressions and their statistical significance:285

283. See generally Alessandro Acquisti, Allan Friedman & Rahul Telang, Is There a Cost to Privacy
Breaches? An Event Study (2006) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Twenty Seventh International
Conference on Information Systems), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquistifriedman-telang-privacy-breaches.pdf; Myung Ko & Carlos Dorantes, The Impact of Information
Security Breaches on Financial Performance of the Breached Firms: An Empirical Investigation, 17 J.
INFO. TECH. MGMT. 2 (2006), available at http://jitm.ubalt.edu/XVII-2/article2.pdf.
284. See discussion infra Part IV.
285. A complete and comprehensive description of this analysis, the procedures used, and the results
are discussed in other work. Thaw, supra note 55, at 89–94.
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Figure 3—Linear Regressions of PRE and PUE Breach Incidence
from t2 to tF

Statistical Data

PRE Linear Regression
(t2 to tF)

PUE Linear Regression
(t2 to tF)

Residual Std. Error
Adj. R-Squared
p-value
Intercept [sig.]
Coefficient x [sig.]

3.759 (on 25 DF)
0.05776
0.1198
29.87322 [*]
-0.14957 [ ]

5.507 (on 28 DF)
0.4596
2.318 * 10-5
87.7074 [***]
-0.5884 [***]

Significance Codes: *** (0.001) ** (0.01) * (0.05)

. (0.1) [blank] (1)

Table—Summary of Key Statistical Information from Linear
Regressions286
The two sections that follow explain the implications of these
trends for the regulatory efficacy and suggest why a blended
regulation model is optimal at preventing breaches of personal
information.

286. The weaker statistical significance reported for the PRE regression line is due to periodicity
selection effects. Observation of the (calendar) monthly incidence of breaches for PREs around the time
of t2 indicates several outlier months. Additionally, testing not yet reported as of the time of this writing
indicated stronger statistical significance with refined approaches to the period for grouping incidence.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

67

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1

354

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

1. Blended Regulation Compared to Directive Regulation Alone
The effects of blended regulation, or a combination of directive
regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, are
measured by the decreasing trend in breach incidence after t2 for
PREs. After t2, PREs—generally healthcare and finance
organizations—were subject not only to their respective forms of
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation (HIPAA or GLBA), but
also to the state SBNs.287 Like all organizations, they have an
incentive to reduce their reportable incidents by implementing
security measures to prevent reportable breaches. Thus, the
downward trend (represented by the blue linear regression line in
Figure 3) represents how rapidly PREs reduced their reportable
incidents.
The rate at which PREs reduced their reportable incidents was
nearly four times less288 than the rate at which PUEs (represented by
the red linear regression line in Figure 3) decreased their reportable
incidents. At first glance, this might appear as though ManagementBased Regulatory Delegation was detrimental, as PREs reduced
incidents at a slower rate than did PUEs. Paradoxically, however, the
opposite is true.
There is no evidence that organizations’ incentives to reduce
security breach incidents vary by industrial sector. If there were such
variance, however, it would likely indicate that the finance and
healthcare sectors had higher incentives than the collective remainder
of industry as those sectors traditionally handle more sensitive
information. Additionally, there is no control data against which to
compare breach incidence—thus there is no method to determine
whether certain sectors were subject to more attacks than were other
sectors. The compliance saturation point (t2), however, provides a
method by which to infer comparative competency.

287. See State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41, for a current list of state SBNs.
288. As listed in Table 1, the slope of the PRE regression line was -0.14957 and the slope of the PUE
regression line was -0.5884, representing a 3.9339 times greater rate of decrease.
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If incentives and available resources to reduce breaches are equal,
and there is a limited total reduction in breaches that can be achieved
(perfect security is, as discussed above, impossible), then the rate of
decrease after t2 will be inversely proportional to organizations’ prior
effectiveness at preventing breaches. In other words, organizations
already possessing information security competencies will experience
a less rapid drop-off in breach incidence reporting after t2 because
they had less far to improve (i.e., they were already some percentage
of the way there). By contrast, organizations that had none or
minimal information security measures in place prior to the influence
of SBNs (at time t2) will experience a more rapid decrease (i.e.,
because they had “further to go”).
Thus the results reported here suggest that the combination of
directive regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation,
at least over the short term, may be as much as four times more
effective at preventing breaches of personal information as is
directive regulation alone. Over the longer term, the trends may
suggest that both organizations will develop sufficient competencies
(assuming the regulatory penalties are sufficient), however this
finding has strong implications for any new subject of regulation
seeking shorter-term efficacy.
2. Blended Regulation Compared to Management-Based
Regulation Alone
The effects of blended regulation, or a combination of directive
regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, are
measured by the decreasing trend in breach incidence after t2 for
PREs. The decreasing trend in breach incidence suggests that
organizations made efforts to improve their information security
practices and reduce reportable security breach incidents. The fact
that after t2 PREs still exhibited a decreasing rate of breach reporting
suggests they still had “room to improve,” notwithstanding their prior
experience being regulated by HIPAA and/or GLBA.
While the exact degree of improvement is more difficult to
quantify than the first comparison, due to the lack of a control group,
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the decreasing trend clearly indicates the addition of directive
regulation—specifically the SBNs—improved healthcare and finance
organizations’ information security capabilities at preventing
breaches of sensitive personal information.
C. Analytical Limitations and Future Research
Before proceeding to suggest conclusions from this quantitative
analysis, certain shortcomings should be noted. First, the analysis
depends on comparing rates of change in reducing breach incidence.
For the reasons discussed above, measuring relative rates of change
is superior to measuring absolute values. However, the use of relative
rates of change assumes a degree of consistency in organizational
incentives to reduce breach reporting. While a facially reasonable
assumption, when sufficient data is available to measure
organizational incentives in this regard, the relative-rates-of-change
analysis should be revisited.289
Second, the linear regressions that form the basis for the rates-ofchange analysis depend on the selection of proper inflection points.
As noted above, and as discussed further elsewhere,290 the
polynomial regression approach employed to determine the inflection
points likely provides reasonable estimates both of when
organizations began to report incidents (t1) and of when organizations
reporting reached “full compliance” (t2). However, randomized
variation of these two values during the analysis process
demonstrated that moderate variance can alter the comparative
difference between the rates-of-change post-full-compliance. In all
cases the PREs had a statistically significantly shallower slope (i.e.,
they still had “less far to go” and thus were likely “better prepared”);
289. Pending ongoing availability of breach incidence data—which may be available from a new
source now that the Open Security Foundation has stopped releasing its dataset (the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse is reviving its aggregation of this data, see https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach)—
the author anticipates proceeding with further analysis on rates-of-change with updated data. Even
without other data on organizational incentives, additional time-series data on breach incidence is likely
to provide further insight into the validity of the rates-of-change analysis approach.
290. See Thaw, supra note 55, at apps. A–A.6.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss2/1

70

Thaw: The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation

2014]

THE EFFICACY OF CYBERSECURITY REGULATION

357

however, over a longer time frame this trend bears further
investigation.
Finally, this dataset—as with many datasets—may be subject to
reporting bias. There is no evidence to suggest it is biased—rather the
contrary—many incidents made it into the dataset before they were
publicly reported pursuant to state Security Breach Notification
laws.291 Nonetheless, the limitations of an informally-compiled
dataset should be noted. As discussed elsewhere, to-date no better
unclassified dataset exists for this analysis, and the author suggests
that lawmakers and regulators may wish to encourage the collection
of such information.292
While these limitations do suggest the need for further research
when better data becomes available, they do not limit the results of
this analysis such that the conclusions are invalid. A finding, for
example, of only twice the rate-of-change between PREs and PUEs
would still suggest a substantial (and statistically significant)
difference between the efficacy of the respective regulatory regimes.
Thus the purpose of this section is to identify limitations and suggest
future research to improve this work, not that the ultimate policy
recommendations are necessarily weakened if the limitations here
were ultimately found substantial.
D. Conclusions from Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis presented here suggests two conclusions.
First, legislators and regulators should consider the addition of
performance-based standards, through directive regulation, to
291. The author is personally aware of such incidents, but cannot disclose further details without
violating human subjects research protocols and/or attorney-client privilege. See infra note 300.
292. See Reporting Data Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th
Cong. (July 18, 2013) (Testimony of David Thaw, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Connecticut)). For an executive summary, see ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., Reporting Data
Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?: Executive Summary of Written
Testimony of Dr. David B. Thaw (July 18, 2013), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/Testimony-Thaw-CMT-Data-Breaches-Consumer-Protection-2013-718.pdf.
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existing regulatory regimes relying on forms of management-based
regulation. In the United States, we have seen such activity in recent
years, with the Department of Health and Human Services adding a
breach notification requirement to HIPAA293 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission issuing guidance suggesting that publiclytraded companies disclose material security incidents in their
quarterly filings.294 Outside the United States, regulators in areas
such as Europe—which employ complex privacy and information
security regulatory regimes, but as of yet do not have comprehensive
breach notification requirements295—may wish to consider
introducing such requirements.
Second, the additional competency Previously Regulated Entities
demonstrated suggests that regulators may wish to expand the reach
of Management-Based Regulatory Delegation models to other
industrial sectors. The FTC’s Section 5 privacy and information
security enforcement jurisprudence may produce such an effect;
however, it is primarily reactive. Some legislative proposals have
been put forth to give the FTC prospective rulemaking authority in
this regard,296 though none have yet gained traction.
Outside the information security space, regulators may wish to
consider blended regulation as an approach for two reasons. First,
organizations previously subject to Management-Based Regulatory
Delegation exhibit greater competency to adapt to new performancebased or other prescriptive regulation when they are subsequently
adopted.297 Second, the addition of performance standards may be
used to achieve marginal improvements in key regulatory areas
where a delegation model fails to achieve desired outcomes—such
additions effectively grant regulators the flexibility to “nudge”
293. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 13402, 123 Stat. 115, 260-63 (2009) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012)).
294. CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, Cybersecurity, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 13,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
295. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 159, at 276.
296. See, e.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong.
§§ 2(a)(1), 3(d)(3), 3(f)(2)(B), 4 (2011).
297. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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regulated entities toward goals without removing entities’ discretion
in heterogeneous industries. It is important to note, however, as
discussed further in Part IV, that certain forms of directive regulation
which specify means of performance (or means to avoid penalties)
may actually reduce the discretion desired of management-based
regulatory approaches.298 Regulators must consider this balance when
adopting new forms of directive regulation to supplement existing
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation.
IV. QUALITATIVE ACCOUNTS OF REGULATION AS DRIVING SECURITY
A. Views from Chief Information Security Officers
In a field lacking substantial empirical data or other literature upon
which to draw, qualitative methods may often form an effective tool
to inform initial research directions. Chief Information Security
Officers (CISOs) are the key individuals within large organizations
responsible for directing the security policies and practices of the
organization and advising senior management on decisions affecting
security risk management. They are on the leading edge of
implementing information security regulatory compliance objectives.
The qualitative data comprises a series of two-hour semi-structured
interviews with Chief Information Security Officers.299 These
interviews were designed to provide insight and intuition about how
regulatory models affect security practices and how those models
bring about change. Given the absence of prior literature upon which
to draw to formulate research questions, the results of these
interviews served both as a direct data source and as a means to help
develop the theoretical framework in Part II and the quantitative
methods used in Part III.

298. See infra Part IV.
299. A complete and comprehensive description of this analysis, the procedures used, and the results
are discussed in other work. Thaw, supra note 55, at 94–107.
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The requirements for protection of human subjects in research
under federal guidelines300 require that an Institutional Review Board
(IRB) review and approve of a protocol for the protection of human
subjects prior to their participation in research. The overseeing IRB
for the CISO interviews was the University of California, Berkeley’s
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS). The
protocol approved by CPHS for this research project requires full
anonymity of the subjects interviewed, as their responses have the
potential to affect their employment adversely.301 Accordingly, while
the author and his co-researchers maintain copies on-file of the
transcripts, the author cannot disclose those transcripts, the identities
of the subjects (beyond the general descriptions provided herein), or
provide copies of the transcripts to the Georgia State University Law
Review.
Interview subjects were recruited from large organizations in the
healthcare, finance, information systems and technologies, consumer
products, and public utilities sectors. Interviewees needed to be the
CISO of their organization or business unit, or the functional
equivalent thereof. Selected subjects included CISOs of:
1. a major computer hardware manufacturer;
2. a major financial services provider;
3. a major software and internet applications provider;
4. a major telecommunications provider;
5. a major research university (with a substantial medical
research campus);
6. a major healthcare services provider;
7. a major health insurance carrier;
8. a major pharmaceutical firm; and

300. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat 342 (1974); Protection of Human
Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2009); Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
301. Comm. for Prot. of Human Subjects, CPHS Application 5–7 (2007) (unpublished research
project application materials, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with Georgia State University
Law Review).
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9. a major provider of healthcare information technology.

The interviews were conducted over a two-year period through
2008 and 2009. In addition to contributing to the theoretical
framework and quantitative analysis, the results of the interviews
yielded two direct findings. First, that directive regulation like SBNs
decrease the importance of technical professionals302 within the
organization, whereas Management-Based Regulatory Delegation
like HIPAA, GLBA, and the FTC’s enforcement actions increase
organizations’ reliance on technical professionals because such
organizations’ general management appear to lack the technical
expertise to make judgments as to “reasonableness” on technical
matters.303 Second, that a lack of guidance from regulators defining
“reasonableness” within the context of information security leaves
CISOs unable to justify requests for additional resources or
imposition of onerous security practices necessary to meet
compliance obligations.304
B. Effects of Regulation on Organizational Roles: Locking The Bank
or Vault Door and Leaving the Back Window Open
The most desirable types of relationships between managers and
professionals within organizations depend on the structure of the
organization. Most of the organizations represented by the CISOs
interviewed for this work employ structures based upon
Fordist/Weberian “command-style” management hierarchies.305
302. Within this context, the term “professional” refers to what law traditionally considers “learned
professionals,” such as physicians, attorneys, accountants, engineers, and scientists. It specifically does
not refer to vocationally trained technicians. Within the information security context, learned
professionals generally would include senior management-level executives with a strong technical
background and expertise tasked with planning and high-level advising, as opposed to vocationallytrained technicians responsible for operating and configuring security technologies in response to highlevel directives. This distinction, while easily articulated, is admittedly difficult to draw in practice, in
large part due to the lack both of formalized education in cybersecurity and of formalized licensure (as
opposed to vocational certification) as discussed in Part II above.
303. Thaw, supra note 55, at 118.
304. See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 159, at 291.
305. See generally W. RICHARD SCOTT & GERALD F. DAVIS, ORGANIZATIONS AND
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There are four conditions necessary for such organizations to
function effectively. First, supervisors must be able to know when
their subordinates are wrong about something.306 Second, supervisors
must know how to correct subordinates’ mistakes.307 Third,
subordinates must be fungible—there must be a market for other
professionals of equal or greater ability to replace them.308 Fourth,
and finally, the consequences of subordinates’ errors must be readily
apparent and those consequences able to be connected to particular
actions on the part of the subordinate.309 Modern organizations,
however, have evolved to understand the need for senior managers to
rely upon the judgment and discretion of technical professionals.310
1. Directive Regulation: SBNs Decrease Reliance on Technical
Professionals
Current SBNs—the predominant form of directive regulation in
information security—exempt from the regulatory penalty of
disclosure any security breach where the data compromised was
encrypted.311 The result, as discussed earlier, is de facto means-based
regulation under which regulated entities respond to the performance
standard by adopting practices to ensure the penalty exception. As
explained by one CISO of a large healthcare organization:

ORGANIZING 46–50 (2007).
306. These criteria were developed with Professor Todd LaPorte (University of California, Berkeley,
Department of Political Science) and are partially derivative from the following works: SCOTT & DAVIS,
supra note 305, at 124–82; JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 117–41 (2007).
307. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 124–82; THOMPSON, supra note 306, at 117-41.
308. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 124–82; THOMPSON, supra note 306, at 117-41.
309. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 124–82; THOMPSON, supra note 306, at 117-41.
310. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 148 (“[A]s levels of complexity, uncertainty, and
interdependence increase, ‘independent’ professionals are likely to move their work into organizational
structures, thus becoming components of a wider division of labor and increasingly subject to more
formalized coordination mechanisms.”).
311. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b(a) (2006) (defining “breach of security” as
“unauthorized access to or unauthorized acquisition of electronic files, media, databases or
computerized data containing personal information when access to the personal information has not
been secured by encryption or by any other method or technology that renders the personal information
unreadable or unusable”) (emphasis added).
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. . . [SBNs] caused us to . . . in a very short period of time,
encrypt 40,000 laptops [with] whole disk encryption . . . .312

The CISO of a large telecommunications company also described
the move toward encryption:
[W]hat we have done is all computers now have to be
encrypted.313

In total, 5 of the 9 respondents314 also identified SBNs as playing a
substantial role in driving their information security practices. One
respondent, from a financial services organization, remarked about
the straightforward character of SBNs regulatory requirement:
. . . [D]espite my reservations about [California’s breach
notification law], on which most of the breach notification
legislation has been modeled, it was exemplary in one
regard . . . it was an extremely small piece of legislation.315

Ironically, while this CISO found the simplicity appealing, it was
this simplicity that decreased the need for managers to rely on
technical professionals’ discretion and judgment. As stated by one
CISO of a large healthcare organization:
And so what’s been really interesting about the Notification
Laws is [they] have come in and [ ] essentially reversed the
whole direction security was taking from when I started this job.

312. Thaw, supra note 55, at 97.
313. Id.
314. In the context of qualitative semi-structured interviews, this finding is significant. The interview
structure did not specifically ask about SBNs, but rather—through a natural discussion style—
encouraged interviewees to discuss the subjects most relevant to them. Interviewees were, in fact,
directly told that the researchers are here for them to tell what is most relevant to the interviewee. In this
format, interviewees are likely to focus extensively on certain topics, and the fact that over half the
interviewees focused on SBNs is a very significant finding.
315. Thaw, supra note 55, at 104.
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[The original direction was] we’re going to figure out the privacy
side of it . . . but we’re also going to build up capabilities to stop
the cyber apocalypse because we’re worried about that sort of
thing after September 11th and also because network security
attacks are getting increasingly sophisticated. We have to build
up the tools and the talents in our shops where we don’t have any
of them and we can’t afford to pay [for] them. We have to do it
ourselves.316

This respondent describes a shift from an original direction where
the security team “ha[d] to do it [them]selves” to a new, “reversed”
direction.317 The respondent goes on to say:
So what’s happened since the Notification Laws have become
sort of ubiquitous in the last three years [is] the security
investment is moved, essentially to crypto. If it moves, encrypt
it. It if stays there, encrypt it. There’s not much reflection on
whether or not actually anyone ever uses that data.318

Here, the respondent describes the effect of directive regulation
with performance standards tied to specific means (the SBNs) in
decreasing their organization’s reliance on the professional’s exercise
of discretion. This condition is well-suited to command-style
hierarchies because clear, absolute standards (like the encryption
exception in SBNs319) create measured outcomes by which managers
can identify and correct the mistakes of subordinates.320
316. Id.at 121–22.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. But note the lack of definition as to what constitutes “encryption.” Under the existing statutory
language, a lost laptop containing two versions of a file with personal information, each of which was
encrypted using Microsoft Office 2003’s implementation of RC-4, would likely satisfy the statutory
definitions referenced supra note 138. This particular implementation of RC-4, while operating at a 128bit encryption key length, has a known vulnerability under which an attacker can break the encryption
with minimal effort. Hongjun Wu, The Misuse of RC4 in Microsoft Word and Excel, CRYPTOLOGY
EPRINT ARCHIVE (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/007.
320. See supra notes 306–09.
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The result, as apparent from the quotes above, is a condition in
which organizations (presumably at the direction of senior
management) focus substantial energy on avoiding the regulatory
penalty by adopting the means-based exception. It is important to
note, however, that this condition may not be inconsistent with the
original intent of the statutes—to protect sensitive consumer data and
reduce incidence of identity theft.321 If data is properly encrypted,
even if lost, it poses no plausible threat to consumers.
This result, however, only focuses on one potential threat—
unencrypted data. If left to their professional discretion, CISOs might
well (and probably would) choose to focus on multiple threats.
2. Management-Based Regulatory Delegation: HIPAA and GLBA
Increase Reliance on Technical Professionals
While perhaps better-suited to the most common types of
organizational structures in place in the United States, directive
regulation may pose other risks for the organization by reducing its
capacity to leverage the flexibility afforded by Management-Based
Regulatory Delegation. Though the addition of performance-based
standards specifying specific means does not reduce the compliance
obligations of management-based models, it may reduce the available
resources to implement the compliance plans developed under those
models. This resource limitation may contribute to a regulatory “race
to the bottom.”
Consider the advantages respondents identified afforded by the
flexibility of a Management-Based Regulatory Delegation model, as
described by the CISO of a large healthcare organization:
They [the Department of Health and Human Services] stayed
technology-neutral. They didn’t specify exact levels of

321. See, e.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. (2011)
(“To protect consumers by requiring reasonable security policies and procedures to protect
computerized data containing personal information, and to provide for nationwide notice in the event of
a security breach.”).
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encryption. They didn’t specify exact methods of user
authentication. A lot of that was in the proposed rule, and they
very rightly took it out.322

Another CISO similarly reported their experiences consulting with
the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics:
. . . meeting with some folks at NCVHS . . . because they have a
mandate to report back to HHS to determine whether or not there
ought to be any changes to the regulations . . . .And [we were
discussing whether] to expand the scope of these safeguards to
apply to de-identified data to avoid some of these risks that we
[respondent’s organization] were open to it not only because we
think we do those things today, but it might be an important
thing to do from their standpoint and from a policy standpoint to
ensure that it isn’t just the companies like ours that think about
these things all the time, but that everybody is put on notice that
this is a good practice.323

All the CISOs interviewed from the finance and healthcare sectors
expressed either a direct or indirect appreciation for their ability to
participate in the rulemaking process for information security
regulations. They remarked that the flexibility afforded by the
regulations, in particular HIPAA, afforded them the ability to meet
regulatory goals while still focusing on the security needs most
salient to their organizations.
Although highly favored by the respondents, regulation that
encourages reliance on professional discretion is disruptive of
command-style hierarchical relationships because it necessarily
creates an environment in which managers both are unaware of and
322. Thaw, supra note 55, at 120.
323. Id. at 115. HIPAA required—as part of its regulatory delegation component—that regulators
consult with and, subject to limited exception, accept the recommendations of the NCVHS as part of the
rulemaking process. See supra text accompanying note 110. See also David Thaw, Enlightened
Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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are unable to correct their subordinates’ (technical professionals)
mistakes. The risk analysis and implementation details of information
security are highly technical. It is nearly impossible for senior
managers, charged with overseeing the operations of an entire
organization, to maintain the knowledge necessary to correct their
subordinates’ mistakes.
This risk, however, must be considered against the risk of
handicapping technical professionals’ ability to identify and address
the most salient security risks. The analysis in this section suggests
that the style of regulation substantially impacts the role and
influence of technical professionals. To paraphrase one CISO, “we
need tools and talents to defend against the cyber apocalypse
(multiple threats) . . . and we can’t afford to pay for them.”324 Thus, if
regulation’s impact on the role of technical professionals within
organizations is ignored, regulators run the risk of ensuring the bank
or vault door is well-secured (data is encrypted) and the back window
is wide open (every other information security threat remains
insufficiently addressed). I do not suggest that this risk is dispositive
of increasing the use of directive regulation, only that its
implementation should be considered with care to avoid the risks
outlined here. Technology-neutral directive regulation, for example,
or that which references standards developed (and perhaps more
importantly, updated) by organizations like the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST), may provide steps toward such
flexibility.325
C. Unreasonable Deficiencies in “Reasonableness:” Lack of Clarity
Impedes Compliance Efforts
When regulation weakens CISOs’ ability to exercise their
professional judgment as to the greatest threats facing the
324. Thaw, supra note 55, at 121–22.
325. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES), FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION 197 (2001),
available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/fips-197.pdf.
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organization, many salient risks may remain unaddressed. The result
may be a “race to the bottom,” in which organizations adopt and
implement compliance plans at the bare minimum level they believe
will pass regulatory muster. This condition may result not as a
function of intended regulatory evasion, but rather as a result of a
redirection of resources to one specific threat (as described above)
and an inability of the CISO to justify requests for additional funding
due to a lack of specificity as to what constitutes “reasonable” in the
context of regulatory requirements.
Examples of this “race to the bottom” pervade regulatory
enforcement actions. Many of the most notable FTC information
security enforcement actions comprise security failures so
irresponsible and obvious that the affected entities’ names have
become synonymous with information security deficiency.326 Such
low-hanging fruit continues to be available to regulators today.327
Current information security regulation relies heavily on a concept
of reasonableness—in developing compliance plans consistent with
the Management-Based Regulatory Delegation models, organizations
must make judgments regarding what constitutes “reasonable
security.” This is particularly true for HIPAA compliance, where
compliance obligations almost always scale to the size, scope, and
complexity of the organization.328
When combined, these factors yield a perfect storm for the
regulatory “race to the bottom.” Directive regulation drives perhapsotherwise-sufficient security budgets toward specific compliance
objectives, such as encryption. This, in turn, reduces the available
resources for other security activities and forces CISOs to focus on
meeting minimum compliance objectives rather than prioritizing the
greatest threats they feel their organizations face. With an abundance
326. In re TJX Cos., No. C-4227, 2008 WL 3150421, at *2–3 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008); In re BJ’s
Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 WL 2395788, at *1–2 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005). Multiple CISO
respondents specifically mentioned T.J. Maxx Cos. (TJX) when discussing security failures and the
costs thereof, specifically associating the company with security deficiencies.
327. See, e.g., In re Twitter, Inc., No. C-4316, 2011 WL 914034 (F.T.C. Mar. 2, 2011).
328. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1173(d),
110 Stat. 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2006)).
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of low-hanging fruit available to regulators—even if likely through
malfeasance, not misfeasance—the bar is set extremely low. Thus,
regulators are faced with an industry standard set perhaps below their
optimal level. As long as low-hanging fruit remains available to
regulators, CISOs will not be able to justify requests for new
resources on the grounds that peer organizations with comparable
policies have been subject to enforcement action. Nor will they be
able to justify requests based on the regulations themselves, as
“reasonable” lacks an operational definition any higher than the lowhanging fruit provided by cases such as B.J.’s Wholesale Club,329 T.J.
Maxx Cos.,330 and Twitter.331 And so the cycle continues.
This analysis strongly suggests the conclusion that regulators
provide more proactive guidance as to what constitutes “reasonable”
standards for security practice. This is, perhaps, not as difficult a
challenge as some of the CISO respondents might suggest. While
including exact encryption specifications in the promulgated
regulations is likely inefficient, referencing current standards on
encryption, such as those promulgated by NIST, provides an
excellent, flexible, and adaptive solution.332 Developing standards is
among NIST’s core competencies, and it publishes Federal
Information Processing Standards on a wide variety of topics,333
including encryption.334 Some legislative proposals have considered
giving the FTC proactive rulemaking authority with respect to
information security.335 Such federal legislation may be well-served
to instruct the Commission that its rulemaking reference standards
clarifying concepts of reasonableness within information security.
Regulators in other substantive areas facing a structurally similar lack

329. BJ’s Wholesale Club, 2005 WL 2395788.
330. TJX Cos., 2008 WL 3150421.
331. Twitter, Inc., 2011 WL 914034.
332. See ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD, supra note 325.
333. Computer Security Resource Center, Publications, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsTC.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2013).
334. ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD, supra note 325.
335. Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), 3(d)(3),
3(f)(2)(B), 4 (2011).
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of clarity as to reasonableness may benefit from such approaches as
well.
CONCLUSION
Three important conclusions follow from this Article. First,
blended regulation—a mixture of Management-Based Regulatory
Delegation and directive regulation—is superior at driving firms to
implement information security practices that will prevent security
breaches than is either regulatory model alone. This is a particularly
important finding for regulators, both domestically and
internationally. Domestically, since conducting the CISO interviews,
we have seen the implementation of a breach notification
requirement by the Department of Health and Human Services and
guidance promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
that publicly-traded companies disclose material information about
security risks to investors.336 Internationally, the European Union has
begun to consider breach notification requirements as well.337
Massachusetts promulgated regulations in 2010 that bear some
resemblance to the Management-Based Regulatory Delegation
models found in HIPAA, GLBA, and the FTC’s enforcement, and
other states and federal regulators in other industrial sectors may
wish to do so as well.338 Thus, in summary, legislators and regulators
considering information security measures may wish to evaluate
whether a comprehensive approach to information security
regulation—as opposed to a piecemeal approach—is appropriate.
Second, the concept of Management-Based Regulatory
Delegation—a deliberate choice by the legislature to heavily encode
regulatory capture both in the administrative rulemaking process and
in the compliance process—clearly affords advantages (efficacy at
achieving the regulatory goal of preventing security breaches), but

336. 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, pt. 164 (2013); CF Disclosure Guidance, supra note 294.
337. Commission Regulation 611/2013, 2013 O.J. (L. 173) 2.
338. 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01 to -.05 (2010).
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also incurs risk of a “race-to-the-bottom” in compliance standards.
The preliminary data presented by the CISO interviews suggests that
blended regulation, by layering on specific directive regulatory goals,
may somewhat abate the risks of this deliberate regulatory capture.
Further study of this concept certainly is warranted.
Finally, the use of information disclosure-based regulation to
achieve the effect of directive legislation is an interesting concept.
There is no evidence that when the California Legislature considered
the first Security Breach Notification law, it envisioned an “encrypt
everything” directive as the result. Yet that appears to have become
the industry standard, at least for the foreseeable future. This “choice
of compliance” approach to regulation may present regulators in
other fields with an interesting option when heavy-handed traditional
directive regulation is undesirable, but disclosure-based regulation
where industries can “sort out for themselves the best approach” is
more amenable.
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